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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a small, but growing, number of scholars have relied
upon market-based or economic-based rationales to support increasing
corporate board diversity—defined as the percentage of racial or ethnic
members on a board.1 Relying on these “business rationales,” scholars
contend that corporations should encourage board diversity because such
diversity not only increases the overall effectiveness of the board and
hence the corporation, but also enhances the corporation’s profitability.2
Consistent with these rationales, some scholars argue that board
homogeneity, like that embodied in Enron’s board, which consisted of
∗
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. J.D.
Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard College. I would like to thank Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Professor Taunya Banks, Professor Richard Boldt, Dean and Marjorie Cook Professor of
Law Karen Rothenberg, as well as participants and organizers of faculty workshops at the
University of Maryland School of Law, the University of Pittsburgh Law School, and
Case Western Reserve Law School for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions
of this Article. Special thanks to Aja Claire Byrd for her research assistance on this
Article. All errors, of course, are mine.
1.
While this Article recognizes that there are many different forms of
diversity, including racial, gender, and viewpoint diversity, this Article focuses on racial
and ethnic diversity and its ability to impact corporate board behavior. While this Article
draws some parallels to issues of gender diversity, this Article is limited to the impact of
racial and ethnic diversity on boards, and the author looks forward to more fully exploring
issues of gender diversity in later scholarly works.
2.
See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on
Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1403–05 (2002) (noting that the
movement for diversity on corporate boards has the potential to counter a corporate
environment focused exclusively on stock price); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron
Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306–08 (2003) (noting that
“diversity may enhance board effectiveness”); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the
Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85 (2000) [hereinafter Ramirez, Diversity in the
Boardroom] (outlining the importance of diversity to American businesses generally, and
boards of directors in particular); Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 837 (2003) [hereinafter Ramirez, Sarbanes-Oxley Reform] (arguing that board
diversity can improve the board’s monitoring function); Janis Sarra, The Gender
Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 457, 494
(2002) (noting that “[d]iversity can enhance corporate governance” in a variety of ways).
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directors who were virtually all white and all male,3 may prevent directors
from considering alternative views and engaging in the critical thinking
necessary to make informed decisions or serve as active monitors.4 Board
diversity may counteract this problem, thereby ensuring that directors
more appropriately perform their managerial and monitoring duties.
Other scholars have asserted that board diversity can have a positive
impact on the corporation’s bottom line by improving a corporation’s
ability to interact with its increasingly diverse employees, customers, and
clients.5
While these business rationales appeared to have garnered little, if
any, attention among legislators engaged in corporate governance
reform,6 they have gained better traction among both business leaders and
judges who maintain that encouraging diversity at all levels of a
corporation is critical to the profitability and viability of a corporation.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Grutter v. Bollinger7 decision, and the
briefs on which that opinion relies,8 reflects one of the most prominent
examples of this acceptance. In that case, the Supreme Court relied, in
part, on statements from business leaders regarding the importance of
diversity in corporate America to uphold affirmative action within the
University of Michigan Law School.9 Indeed, sixty-five of the nation’s

3.
Apparently, of the fourteen Enron directors, only one was a woman, while
three were people of color—one Hispanic, one African American, and one Asian (who
was also the one woman). See O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1306 n.423. Hence, eleven of
the fourteen directors were white, while thirteen of the fourteen directors were men.
4.
See, e.g., id. at 1306.
5.
See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 2, at 1365–66; Ramirez, Diversity in the
Boardroom, supra note 2, at 93–95.
6.
Many reforms were enacted post-Enron, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), along with reforms to the listing requirements of various
agencies involving corporate governance matters. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The
Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 515–19 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala
G. Dharan eds., 2004) (discussing some reforms); see also infra Part I.B. None of these
measures require, or even recommend, increased board diversity.
7.
539 U.S. 306 (2003). On the same day the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Grutter, it held in another opinion that the University of Michigan College of
Arts and Sciences’s admission policy, which was based on a point system, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not narrowly
tailored. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
8.
See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), and Gratz (No. 02-516) [hereinafter 65 Leading
American Businesses Brief]; Brief of General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), and Gratz (No. 02-516) [hereinafter GM
Brief].
9.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. In addition to relying on American businesses’
assertions of the importance of diversity to corporate America to buttress its claim that a
law school’s desire to attain diversity was a compelling state interest, the Court relied on
assertions from high ranking military officers who emphasized the importance of a
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top businesses filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to find that
diversity within America’s law schools represented a compelling
government interest because “the skills and training needed to succeed in
business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas
and viewpoints,”10 and such exposure is needed at “every level of an
organization.”11 General Motors Corporation, which filed a separate
brief, argued that “the future of American business and, in some measure,
of the American economy depend[ed]” on allowing “academic institutions
to select racially and ethnically diverse student bodies.”12 In the Supreme
Court’s view, these kinds of assertions represented “real,” “not
theoretical,” evidence that corporations needed a diverse student
population from which they draw their workforce to perform effectively
in the marketplace.13 In accepting this evidence, the Supreme Court
seemingly endorsed various business rationales for diversity—rationales
which have implications for board diversity.
This Article critically examines the viability of these business
rationales for diversity in an effort to determine whether such rationales
can or should be used as a basis for justifying efforts to increase board
diversity.14 This examination reveals that such rationales promise more—
and in some cases significantly more—than directors of color can
realistically deliver. In addition, this Article concludes that while there
may be practical reasons for adopting business rationales, there are also
individual and societal costs associated with adopting such rationales as
the dominant, if not sole, strategy for achieving diversity, which appear to
have been ignored or underappreciated.
By way of background, Part I of this Article provides data on the
current status of racial and ethnic diversity within corporate boards, and
reveals the basic lack of diversity within the boardrooms of most major
corporations. Part I also examines measures enacted in response to recent
corporate governance scandals in order to assess whether those measures
will lead to an increase in the number of board members of color. This
Part concludes that while some measures may open the door for
enhancing board diversity, others may undermine such enhancement,
“racially diverse officer corps,” noting that all selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective. Id. at 331.
10.
65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 5.
11.
Id. at 5–6.
12.
GM Brief, supra note 8, at 2.
13.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (stating that diversity in schools “‘better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals’”) (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae at 3, Grutter (No. 02-241), and Gratz (No. 02-516)).
14.
For a critical examination of the business rationales for diversity in the
context of lawyers in corporate law firms, see David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is
Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based
Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548
(2004).
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particularly measures that focus on recruiting directors with a particular
financial background.
Part II critically assesses the various business rationales legal
scholars and business leaders have advanced, including those who signed
onto amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court’s Grutter decision, in
order to determine whether directors of color can achieve the claims
underlying those rationales. This Part also evaluates available empirical
research on the impact of diversity on the corporation’s bottom line, and
explores whether such research and arguments used to support corporate
diversity more generally can be applied to boards and the specific
obligations they undertake. In addition, Part II explores social science
data on group and corporate decision-making to ascertain the applicability
of that data to racial and ethnic board members. Part II concludes that
directors of color may not be able to achieve many of the objectives
underlying the business rationales for diversity—particularly when those
objectives are viewed in the context of the roles such directors undertake
and the current manner in which boards are constructed.
In light of this conclusion, Part III focuses on whether those
interested in board diversity should rely upon business rationales by
weighing some of the practical benefits of such rationales against their
costs to individual directors of color and the communities from which
they come. This Part begins by acknowledging that the adoption of
business rationales represents a strategic response to the apparent
rejection of more traditional moral and social justifications for diversity,
and hence such rationales may be viewed as a second best alternative for
achieving diversity. However, this Part warns that adopting this
alternative does have individual and societal costs that have not been fully
examined. In particular, this Part demonstrates that embracing rationales
encouraging overextension and marginalization of directors of color may
not only undermine the effectiveness of individual directors, but may also
undermine future diversity efforts.
Drawing on literature regarding the effects of universal
commodification, Part III also suggests that, given the historically
negative treatment of racial groups within our nation, relying on
rationales that encourage corporations and society to view people of
color15 as commodities is not only morally troublesome, but may also
have the practical impact of encouraging the devaluation of such people.
This Part also points out that shifting rationales for diversity away from
moral or social justifications may be interpreted as an acknowledgement
of the illegitimacy of those justifications, and argues that there are costs
associated with that acknowledgement. Finally, this Part asserts that even
if business rationales prove beneficial to diversity efforts in the short
15.
This Article uses the term “people of color” generally to refer to African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans as a group.
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term, ceding the moral and social justification for diversity to economic or
business ones could have long-term negative repercussions for
maximizing diversity both inside and outside of the corporate boardroom.
This Article therefore concludes that there are considerable reasons
to be cautious regarding embracing business rationales, not only because
they create unrealistic expectations about the manner and extent that
directors of color can impact a corporation’s bottom line, but also because
their costs may outweigh their practical benefits, particularly if those
rationales represent the dominant or sole justification for achieving board
diversity.
I.

DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE BOARDROOMS: A VIEW FROM THE TOP
A.

Analyzing the Empirical Evidence on Board Diversity

At first glance, the story about racial diversity within the boardroom
appears to be a good one because many American corporations have at
least some diversity in their boardrooms, and the number of board
members of color has grown over the past decades. A 2004 Korn/Ferry
International study of board membership revealed that 76% of Fortune
1000 companies have at least one member of an ethnic minority on their
board of directors.16 This reflects a 5% increase from two years prior, and
16.
KORN/FERRY INT’L, 31ST ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 2004, at 11
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY]. It is apparently very difficult to determine
with accuracy the number of directors of color on corporate boards. Indeed, according to
Catalyst, a leading research and advisory organization working to advance women in
business, the racial and ethnic composition of boards is not publicly available. CATALYST,
2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS: A CALL TO ACTION IN A NEW ERA
OF
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
(FACTSHEET)
2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.catalystwomen.org/bookstore/files/fact/WBD03factsheetfinal.pdf.
Hence,
researchers must rely on company responses. See id. This difficulty may explain why
many of the studies on director diversity report conflicting numbers. Then, too, these
numbers may be viewed with some skepticism because of the reporting bias—the notion
that companies with the greatest amount of diversity will be most likely to respond to
surveys on board diversity.
This Article relies primarily on data collected by Korn/Ferry International because
that study appears to involve the greatest number of companies and responses. Its 2004
study was based on data collected from 904 proxy statements and responses from nearly
1000 directors of Fortune 1000 companies. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra, at 4, 9.
Similarly, its 2003 study was based on responses from 1362 directors of Fortune 1000
companies and data from over 900 companies. Korn/Ferry Int’l, Publications: 30th
Annual
Board
of
Directors
Study
2003
(2003),
available
at
http://www.kornferry.com/Library/Process.asp?P=Pubs_Detail&CID=960&LID=1. It is
also consistent with some other studies. A 2000 study by Fortune magazine revealed that
about 65% of Fortune 1000 companies had at least one member of an ethnic minority on
the board. See Stephanie N. Mehta, What Minority Employees Really Want, FORTUNE,
July 10, 2000, at 180, 182–83. A 2000 study by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center found that 67% of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies had at least one person
of color on their board. Press Release, Investor Responsibility Research Center, IRRC
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a 32% increase from ten years ago.17 According to the Korn/Ferry study,
African Americans account for 47% of such seats, as compared to 31% in
1994; Latinos hold 18%, as compared to 9% in 1994; and Asian
Americans hold 11%, as compared to 4% in 1994.18 Moreover, in 1973,
only 7% of Fortune 1000 companies had boards containing at least one
ethnic minority.19 Hence, the last thirty years has seen a considerable
increase in the number of people of color serving as directors of major
corporations.
A closer inspection reveals a different tale because such people only
hold a small percentage of overall board seats. Of course, if 76% of
companies have at least one person of color on their boards, then the
Korn/Ferry study demonstrates that nearly a quarter of Fortune 1000
companies do not have any people of color on their boards.20 Moreover,
studies reveal that people of color hold only 6.9% of the more than 11,500
board seats available within Fortune 1000 companies.21
More
Releases 2000 Board Practices Report (Dec. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.irrc.org/company/12012000boardprac.html. That study provided data from
418 S&P 500 companies. Id.
17.
2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 11–12 (noting that in 2002, 71%
of Fortune 1000 companies had at least one or more ethnic minorities on their board, and
in 1994, only 44% of Fortune 1000 companies had at least one or more ethnic minorities
on their boards). According to the 2004 Korn/Ferry study, 75% of companies had one or
more ethnic minorities on their boards in 2003, as compared to 71% in 2002, 68% in 2001,
65% in 2000, 65% in 1999, and 47% in 1995. Id. at 12. The 2004 Korn/Ferry study also
found that 82% of Fortune 1000 companies had at least one woman on their boards in
2004, compared to 63% in 1994. Id. at 11.
18.
Id. at 11. According to the study, African Americans held 34% of minorityheld board seats in 1995, 41% in 1999, 41% in 2000, 42% in 2001, 44% in 2002, 47% in
2003, and 47% in 2004. Id. at 12. Latinos held 9% in 1995, 14% in 1999, 14% in 2000,
16% in 2001, 17% in 2002, 19% in 2003, and 18% in 2004. Id. Asian Americans held
4% in 1995, 10% in 1999, 11% in 2000, 10% in 2001, 10% in 2002, and 10% in 2003, and
11% in 2004. Id.
19.
Bus. for Soc. Responsibility, Issue Brief: Board Diversity, available at
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.fcm?DocumentID=443 (last visited
July 23, 2005).
20.
See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 11.
21.
See Gary Strauss, Microquest Study Finds: Good Old Boys’ Network Still
Rules Corporate Boards, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.mqc.com/USAtoday.html. According to the study, 492 people of color hold
798 of 11,500 board seats. Id. Fortune magazine reports that people of color comprised
21% of boards in 2003, 19% in 2002, and 11% in 2001. Cora Daniels, 50 Best Companies
for Minorities, FORTUNE, June 28, 2004, at 136, 138. However, the data may cover more
than Fortune 1000 companies because Fortune contacted Fortune 1000 companies and
200 of the largest privately held U.S. companies. Id. at 140. That report did not indicate
the number of responses on which it was based. However, an earlier report stated that
people of color made up 19% of boardrooms in 2003, 18% in 2002, and 11% in 2001.
Jonathan Hickman et al., 50 Best Companies for Minorities, FORTUNE, July 7, 2003, at
103, 103. That study was based on 141 responses from Fortune 1000 companies and the
200 largest privately held U.S. companies. Id.; see also Jeremy Kahn, Diversity Trumps
The Downturn, FORTUNE, July 9, 2001, at 114, 115 (commenting on data). Interestingly,
the two studies appear to report inconsistent data. Then too, there may be an even greater
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specifically, African Americans hold roughly 3.3%, Asian Americans
hold nearly 1.9%, and Latinos hold approximately 1.6% of the board seats
of Fortune 1000 companies.22 Similarly, people of color account for only
8.8% of the board seats at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 companies.23
These numbers reveal that people of color occupy only a small portion of
corporate board seats.
The empirical evidence on board seats also reveals that people of
color hold a smaller percentage of board seats relative to their percentage
of the population and the workforce. A recent report conducted by the
U.S. Census Bureau found that racial and ethnic minority groups made up
about 29% of the nation’s population.24 The most recent U.S. census
report in 2000 found that people of color represent a majority of the
population in almost half of the nation’s 100 largest cities.25 Moreover,
one researcher estimates that by 2050, people of color will constitute
almost half of the nation’s population.26 Another study estimates that
during this decade, minorities, immigrants, and women will occupy 85%
of all new jobs.27 When viewed against their percentage in the population
and workforce, therefore, racial and ethnic minorities appear to be
underrepresented in corporate boardrooms.
reporting bias in the context of the Fortune survey because it is designed to determine the
top companies for people of color. One may expect, therefore, that companies with
policies favorable towards people of color, including policies that ensure a high
percentage of such people in their upper ranks, would be more likely to respond to the
survey than those without such policies. In this sense, the study may be skewed to
producing more positive results. It is also worth noting that the sample size in at least one
of the studies is only 141 responses out of a possible 1200. Such a small sample size not
only calls the data into question, but also the relatively large number of nonresponses
could be interpreted to reflect a lack of concern for diversity within the nation’s top
corporations.
22.
See Strauss, supra note 21. According to the study, 186 African Americans
hold 388 seats, 176 Asian Americans hold 223 seats, while 129 Latinos hold 186 seats. Id.
23.
See Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Boards Lack Gender, Racial Equality,
WSJ.COM (July 9, 2003), at http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/inthelead/
20030709-inthelead.html. The Investor Responsibility Research Center found that 7.4%
of board seats were held by people of color in 2000. See Press Release, supra note 16.
24.
See POPULATION ESTIMATES PROGRAM, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION
ESTIMATES FOR STATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: JULY 1, 1999, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/state/srh/srh99.txt.
25.
Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Urban & Metro. Policy, Census 2000 Matters: Racial
Change in the Nation’s Largest Cities: Evidence from the 2000 Census (Apr. 2001),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/citygrowth.htm. In 1990, whites
represented more than 50% of the population in seventy of the 100 largest cities. By 2000,
whites were a majority in only fifty-two of those cities. Id.
26.
See Jon Meacham, The New Face of Race, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 38,
40 (estimating that 47% of Americans will be African American, Latino, Asian American,
or Native American).
27.
See DIVERSITY BEST PRACTICES & BUSINESS WOMEN’S NETWORK, BEST OF
THE BEST: CORPORATE AWARDS FOR DIVERSITY & WOMEN 2003–2004, at 11 (2004),
available at http://www.diversitybestpractices.com/pdf/taste_bob04.pdf.
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Further dissection of the empirical data on board diversity reveals an
even more troubling story because racial minorities tend to hold multiple
directorships, a phenomenon unique to racial minorities, and African
Americans in particular. Thus, a 2002 study revealed that of the
approximately 4300 people who serve on boards of S&P 500 companies,
only twenty-seven sit on five boards or more.28 Seven of these twentyseven board members are African American.29 Moreover, of the 4300
S&P 500 board members, only five sit on six boards or more, and four out
of these five board members are African American.30 Thus, while
relatively few whites hold multiple board positions, most of the board
positions held by African Americans tend to be held by a subset of that
group. This has led one commentator to note, “there is no real diversity in
the diversity of corporate boards.”31 In other words, the raw number of
people of color serving on boards is lower than the data suggests because
it reflects the multiple directorships held by racial minorities.
Taken together, and regardless of the yardstick one utilizes, the view
from the top reveals that corporate boards lack diversity. Certainly, there
has been some historical increase within the last thirty years, ensuring that
corporations have at least a minimum amount of diversity among their
directors. However, as a group, these corporations have not moved
beyond the minimum. This is reflected not only by comparing the
percentage of people of color on boards to their percentage in the
workforce and population more generally, but also from the realization
that the relatively high number of directors of color serving on multiple
boards means that the actual number of people of color who serve on
boards is lower than the empirical data indicates.32 The empirical data
therefore suggests that our corporate structure continues to be a

28.
Dan Ackman, Black Directors: Diversity Without Diversity, FORBES.COM
(Aug. 8, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/08/08/0808blackdirectors.html.
29.
Id. Those seven are Shirley A. Jackson, president of Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute; William H. Gray III, president of the United Negro College Fund; Franklin
Thomas, former president and chief executive officer (CEO) of the Ford Foundation;
Vernon Jordan, lawyer and investment banker; James A. Johnson, vice chairman of
Perseus; Louis Sullivan, former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and
president emeritus of the Morehouse School of Medicine; and James Cash, Jr., professor at
Harvard Business School. Id. Moreover, Ann Jordan, Vernon Jordan’s wife, sits on three
boards, meaning that she and her husband together hold nine board seats. Lynn Norment,
Black Women on Corporate Boards, EBONY, Mar. 2002, at 42, 42, 46.
30.
Ackman, supra note 28.
31.
Id.
32.
It is difficult to have a discourse regarding board diversity without an
empirical context that serves to outline the contours of the issue. The fact that the
empirical data on board diversity appears relatively unreliable, therefore, should represent
cause for concern, and suggests that diversity advocates should push for public disclosure
of such information.
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demographic pyramid with the bulk of our diversity reserved for the
bottom portions of that pyramid.33
B.

Diversity and Board Reforms: A Silver Lining to Corporate
Scandals?

Arguably the positive by-product of corporate governance scandals
has been the increased attention to, and reforms aimed at, addressing
shortcomings in America’s corporate governance system.34 Indeed,
Enron caused business and government leaders to assess more critically
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and ultimately to
alter those mechanisms.35 While no reform measure specifically requires,
or even strongly encourages, increased diversity on corporate boards,
some measures offer the potential for such an increase to occur.
However, if corporations focus on recruiting directors with traditional
financial backgrounds, then this potential may not be realized.
In general, reform efforts aimed at corporate boards increase the
likelihood that corporations must recruit new board members, thus
expanding opportunities for all new board members, including racial and
ethnic minority members. Indeed, given the increased liability associated

33.
This does not appear to be a phenomenon unique to people of color. Indeed,
research by Catalyst suggests a similar pattern for women. Thus, while in 2002 women
comprised approximately 47% of the labor force, they only accounted for 12.4% of
Fortune 1000 board seats. See CATALYST, 2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD
DIRECTORS: A CALL TO ACTION IN A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2, 5 (2003)
(on file with author). Then too, women tend to hold multiple board seats in higher
percentages than their male counterparts. See id. at 8. The fact that women appear to be
fairing only slightly better than people of color suggests a general resistance to all forms
of diversification at the board level.
34.
See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and
Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 856 (2003) (noting that
corporate scandals have “resulted in a significant and broad scale re-examination of the
American system of corporate governance”); see also 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra
note 16, at 5–6 (noting changes in corporate governance as a result of corporate
governance scandals, such as boards holding sessions without the CEO and formalizing
the lead director role). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3
(2002) (criticizing and questioning the need for reforms). The Korn/Ferry study found
that companies had begun devoting sections of their proxies to discussions of the
corporation’s corporate governance philosophy, and providing a more detailed description
of corporate governance matters. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 9.
According to the study, as a result of recent problems, 80% of corporations had formalized
the role of the lead director—appointing a director to preside over sessions and evaluate
the CEO—as compared to only 32% in 2002. Id. at 27. Such a role was seen as
“controversial and divisive” prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. Then too, 90% of corporations
reported having a corporate governance committee, representing an increase from 62% in
2002 prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. at 32.
35.
See Elson & Gyves, supra note 34, at 856.
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with being a director of a major public company,36 many directors have
resigned or refused renomination, while others have declined board
positions.37 Alternatively, directors faced with rising exposure to liability
have begun to limit the number of board positions they are willing to
hold.38 Directors may also be compelled to limit their number of
directorships based on the greater attention that role now requires. In fact,
a recent survey of mid-sized public companies found that the hours
directors devote to their job have nearly doubled as a result of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).39 People who cannot
devote such increased attention to their position as directors may be
forced to resign. At the very least, such increased attention cuts against
36.
In January of 2005, directors at WorldCom agreed to a settlement in which
they would personally pay eighteen million dollars of a fifty-four million dollar settlement
with shareholders, while directors at Enron agreed to personally pay thirteen million
dollars of a $168 million settlement with shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk, What’s $13
Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A17 (discussing Enron’s director
settlement); Ben White, Former Directors Agree To Settle Class Actions, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2005, at E1 (discussing the Enron and WorldCom settlements).
37.
See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 10 (noting directors
resigning); BERNARD BLACK ET AL., OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LIABILITY 1 n.4 (Stanford Law
School John M. Olin Program in Econ., Working Paper No. 250, 2003) (citing studies that
found people were declining board positions based on fear of increased liability),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=382422; Paredes, supra
note 6, at 521 (noting that “aggressive” reform efforts may narrow the pool of potential
candidates for directors); Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors into a
Long, Tedious Task, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at B1 (noting people turning down
director positions as a result of increased liability exposure). Korn/Ferry also found an
increase in the percentage of Americans declining board invitations because of the risk.
The amount has more than doubled since Sarbanes-Oxley came into law, going from 13%
in 2002 to 29% in 2004. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 7.
38.
See Dunham, supra note 37, at B1. Indeed, even directors internationally
have declined board positions due to the perceived risk associated with them. Thus, 51%
of directors in the United Kingdom as compared to 46% in the prior year reported
declining board positions, while 31% of German directors indicated that they had declined
positions, an increase from 11% in 2003. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 42.
39.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Tamara Loomis, For Public Companies, a High
Price for Compliance, NAT’L L.J., May 12, 2003, at 18 (citing a study conducted by the
law firm of Foley & Lardner of thirty-two companies and a review of 328 proxy
statements). The study represents the first to capture the costs associated with the
regulations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Loomis, supra, at 18. The study found that
directors expected the annual number of hours they devoted to the board would go from
125 hours to more than 200 hours. Id. The study found that since the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the average price of being public had gone from $1.3 million to almost
$2.5 million. Id. Almost two-thirds of the increased costs associated with being public
stemmed from a rise in directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, which went from an
average of $329,000 a year to $639,000 a year. Id. Rising accounting and legal fees also
explain the increased costs involved with being public. Id. Similarly, the Korn/Ferry
study found that boards devoted increased attention to their duties as a result of SarbanesOxley. See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 14–15. Thus, both audit
committees and full boards reported meeting more frequently. Id.
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directors serving on multiple boards.40 Either result forces companies to
search for new directors.41 Such a search may represent an opportunity
for corporations to reach out to people of color and make their
boardrooms more diverse.42
More specifically, reform measures that require corporations to have
more independent directors can have a positive impact on the number of
directors of color.43 One of the principle reform efforts post-Enron was to
ensure that corporations have a majority of outside and independent
directors on their boards.44 Thus, based on the notion that increasing the
number of independent directors in a corporation would enhance the
quality of corporate board oversight, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) altered its corporate governance rules after Enron to require its
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors on their
boards.45 The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ
Stock Market (NASDAQ) also impose such requirements on their listed

40.
The Korn/Ferry study found that directors sitting on a large number of
boards were resigning. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 10. Similarly, the
Korn/Ferry study found that most international directors who declined positions were
those who held multiple directorships. Id. at 42. Then too, corporations have begun to
limit the number of external directorships the CEO may take—generally to two. See id. at
24. Hence, while only 23% of corporations imposed such limits in 2001, now 51% of
corporations have such a requirement. Id.
41.
See Loomis, supra note 39, at A18.
42.
The Korn/Ferry study reported that 12% of companies reported needing to
add new directors as a result of new reforms, as opposed to 3% in 2003. 2004
KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 37. However, that study also reports that when
directors resign, the vacancies are not being filled. See id. at 10. The study suggests that
this may be the result of corporations creating smaller boards or the fact that recruiting
directors is more difficult. See id.
43.
This Article uses the term independent director to refer both to those
directors who do not hold any employment position within a corporation (and therefore
may be considered “outside” directors), and to those directors who do not have any
material business or personal relationship with the corporation.
44.
Reforms pressuring corporations to increase the number of outside and
independent directors pre-date Enron, and in fact have been advocated for many years.
See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982) (describing reforms related to increasing
independent board directors); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of
Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 787 (2003) (noting that “[p]robably the most
significant trend in board governance in the United States in the last twenty years has been
the increase in the number and proportion of outside directors on corporate boards of
directors”); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270–72
(1997) (describing efforts aimed at ensuring greater independence of board directors).
45.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2005)
COMPANY
MANUAL],
available
at
[hereinafter
NYSE
LISTED
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html; see also
id. § 303A.02(a) (defining an independent director, in part, as a director who does not
have any “material relationship” with the company).
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companies.46 Moreover, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE require listed
companies to have both a nominating or corporate governance committee
(responsible for identifying qualified directors) and a compensation
committee (responsible for reviewing executive compensation), and each
member of those committees must be independent.47 Finally, SarbanesOxley, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE all require each member of a
board’s audit committee to be independent.48 These reforms collectively
require corporations to increase the number of independent directors
serving on their boards.49
Such an increase has positive repercussions for the number of board
members of color. Indeed, one study found that corporations with a
greater percentage of inside directors were less likely to have directors of
color, suggesting that women and people of color tend to be outside,
independent directors.50 Other studies similarly revealed that corporations
tend to find their directors of color outside of the company.51 Hence,
46.
See AM. STOCK EXCH., AMEX COMPANY GUIDE §§ 121(A), 802(a) (2005)
[hereinafter AMEX COMPANY GUIDE], available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/
AmericanStockExchangeAMEX/AmexCompanyGuide/default.asp; NASDAQ STOCK
MARKET, INC., MARKETPLACE RULES §§ 4200(a)(15), 4350(c)(1) (2004) [hereinafter
NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES], available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/
MarketplaceRules.pdf.
47.
See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 46, §§ 804(a), 805(a) (requiring all
nominating and compensation committee members to be independent); NASDAQ
MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 46, § 4350(c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(3)(B)(ii), (c)(4)(A)(ii)
(requiring that all compensation committee members and all nominating committee
members be independent); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 45, §§
303A.04(a), 303A.05(a) (listing the committees’ minimal responsibilities, and requiring
that all nominating and compensation committee members be independent).
48.
See § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (defining independent as meaning that a board
member cannot be an insider of the corporation, and cannot receive any compensation
from the corporation other than in relation to her fees as a director); AMEX COMPANY
GUIDE, supra note 46, § 803(a); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 46, §
4350(d)(2); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 45, § 303A.07(b).
49.
The Korn/Ferry study reports that new regulations have not impacted the
balance between inside and outside directors. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at
11. Instead, the average number of outside directors is nine, the same average reported
since 1990. Id. This suggests that many of the corporate reform measures had already
been implemented prior to Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley. Hence, it is the increased liability
and attention associated with holding directorships that appear to account for the need for
more directors, and when this need arises, corporations recognize that they must seek
outside directors to fulfill it.
50.
DAVID A. CARTER ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BOARD DIVERSITY, AND
FIRM VALUE 16 (Okla. State Univ., Working Paper, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304499. The study also found a very
strong correlation between the percentages of women and minorities on corporate boards:
companies with a high percentage of female directors also tended to have a high
percentage of minority directors, and vice versa, suggesting a concerted effort by these
corporations to have greater overall diversity on their boards. Id. at 19.
51.
Thus, 82% of directors of color at S&P 1500 corporations were outside
directors as compared to 66% of directors generally.
Press Release, Investor
Responsibility Research Center, IRCC Study Pinpoints Trends in Director Composition
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reform efforts aimed at increasing the number of independent directors on
boards may serve a dual purpose of ensuring an increase in the number of
directors of color on boards.52
Of course, the general focus on reducing the number of multiple
directorships may prove a double-edged sword for directors of color. On
one hand, because such directors tend to have the highest number of
multiple directorships, that focus may have a greater impact on them,
triggering a reduction in their numbers. On the other hand, corporations
may feel obligated, for example, to fill their “Latino” director seat with
another Latino director. Such an obligation means that, while the raw
number of people of color serving on boards may increase because
different people will hold board seats, the total number of board members
of color may remain static. In this way, the impact of these reforms on
directors of color appears more nuanced.
Also, the emphasis, both in specific requirements and in general
reform rhetoric, on recruiting directors with some financial background
and experience may make it more difficult to increase the number of
directors of color. More generally, Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and congressional investigations suggested that some directors
failed to adequately probe financial transactions, while others failed to
comprehend sufficiently financial information regarding company
transactions and financial data within their companies’ annual reports.53
This suggestion sparked concern about the financial literacy of corporate
directors, and a general desire for improvement. In response, some
and Compensation (Nov. 15, 2001), available at www.irrc.com/company/
11142001_BdPrac01.html.
52.
Given that women also tend to be outside directors, such reforms could have
a similar positive impact on increasing the number of women who serve as board
members.
53.
See Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and
Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327,
420–22 (citing a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) finding that a director
ignored clear warning signs of financial impropriety and thus did not fulfill his directorial
duties); Elson & Gyves, supra note 34, passim (citing to the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations’ report); Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer
Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the SarbanesOxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12–13 & nn.48–54 (2002) (citing reports in which
directors claimed to be unaware of company financial reports, as well as reports that board
members “fail[ed] to curb fraudulent accounting practices”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer Fiduciary
Obligations, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 956–59 (2002) (noting that directors made
decisions without sufficient awareness or understanding of company financial
information); Paredes, supra note 6, at 505–08 & 506 n.39 (summarizing the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’s assessment of the role of Enron’s board in
Enron’s collapse, and noting the board’s failure to prevent the company from engaging in
high risk accounting practices). But see A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to
Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25 (2003) (noting that “even
financially sophisticated directors often fail to understand . . . financial risks facing their
firms”).
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reforms require particular directors to have some financial background
and experience. Thus, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE, all require
each member of the audit committee of a listed company to be
“financially literate.”54 Sarbanes-Oxley requires public corporations to
disclose whether their audit committees include a financial expert, and if
they do not, to explain why such an expert is not a member of the
committee.55 Such disclosure essentially ensures that public corporations
appoint a financial expert to the audit committee of their board.
It may be difficult for some directors of color to meet the financial
background and expertise requirement. Indeed, there appear to be very
few people of color (and, for that matter, very few people)56 who qualify
as a financial expert based upon traditional criteria. For example, under
both SEC and AMEX guidelines, one method for assessing whether a
director can qualify as a financial expert examines whether the director
has education and experience as a chief financial officer (CFO) or in a
position with similar functions.57 However, a 2000 survey of Fortune 500
companies revealed that people of color account for only fourteen of the
chief financial officers of such companies, ten of the treasurers, and five
of the controllers.58 Hence, few people of color can meet this standard of
financial expertise based on serving in these kinds of positions.
Another method pursuant to which a person can be deemed a
financial expert is by “actively supervising” someone who is a CFO or in
an equivalent position.59 Presumably, this means that directors must be a
chief executive or in some other high-level position to qualify as a
financial expert based on this criterion. However, the fact that there are
only three black chief executive officers (CEO) of Fortune 500
companies reveals the difficulties people of color may have in meeting
54.
See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 46, § 121(B)(2)(a)(ii); NASDAQ
MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 46, § 4350(d)(2)(A); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL,
supra note 45, § 303A.07(a) cmt.
55.
Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley required the SEC to issue rules that require
issuers “to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of
that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert.” § 407(a), 116
Stat. at 790. This requirement is now embodied in Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.401(h) (2004).
56.
The Korn/Ferry study reported that Sarbanes-Oxley’s definition of financial
expert makes it very difficult to find directors to serve in that capacity. See 2004
KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 37. The study reported that 29% of corporations
found it “difficult” or “very difficult” to find people with the financial expertise necessary
to serve on boards. See id. at 35.
57.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3)(i); AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 46, §
121(B)(2)(a)(ii).
58.
Roy Harris, The Illusion of Inclusion: Why Most Corporate Diversity Efforts
Fail, CFO, May 2001, at 42, 44 (citing a study undertaken by CFO magazine).
59.
17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3)(ii). That provision also requires that a financial
expert be able to understand and assess the application of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). Id. § 229.401(h)(2)(i)–(ii).
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this criteria.60 Then too, financial experts must have experience preparing
and evaluating financial statements of the “breadth and level of
complexity” that they can reasonably expect to be raised by the issuer’s
financial statement.61 Such experience does not typify the profile of many
directors of color.
The fact that only a few people of color hold the kinds of positions
within Fortune 500 companies that confer financial expertise is indicative
of the relative lack of experience such people may have in this area.
Consistent with this indication, studies reveal that directors of color tend
to have more varied backgrounds than their white counterparts. Such
directors typically have experience in government, law, or academia,
while white directors are more likely to have business and financial
experience from having served as a CEO.62 All of this data reveals that
directors of color may have less financial and business experience than
white directors. Thus, corporations that focus on recruiting directors with
financial expertise may experience a “pool” problem in relation to people
of color.63 Such a problem, in turn, may represent a stumbling block for
increasing the number of directors of color.
Hence, while some reform measures may facilitate the increase of
diversity within corporate boards, others may cut against that increase.
The reality appears to be that more corporate board seats may open up as
a result of reform measures. However, because there is no specific
requirement for board diversity, whether corporations choose to fill these
openings with people of color remains an option. The next Parts will
address whether rationales for board diversity based on economic or
business concerns can serve as the impetus for ensuring that corporations
will exercise that option.
II.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS CASE FOR DIVERSITY AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE BOARDS

60.
The three current black CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are Ken Chenault
of American Express Company, Stan O’Neal of Merrill Lynch & Company, and Richard
Parsons of Time Warner Incorporated. See Latif Lewis, Black Execs Calling the Shots,
BLACKENTERPRISE.COM (Oct. 20, 2004), at http://www.blackenterprise.com/
printarticle.asp?id=905. Franklin Raines, the first black CEO of a Fortune 500 company,
announced in December of 2004 that he was leaving Fannie Mae. Bethany McLean, The
Fall of Fannie Mae, FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 2005, at 122, 130, 138. There have been only six
African American CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, but two more have been hired,
bringing the total number to eight. See Lewis, supra. Indeed, Kmart has hired its first
African American CEO, Aylwin Lewis, and Darden Restaurants has hired Clarence Otis,
an African American, to serve as CEO. Id.
61.
17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(2)(iii).
62.
For example, in assessing the phenomenon of multiple directors, Dan
Ackman notes that his analysis revealed that white directors tend to be CEOs or former
CEOs while directors of color have more varied backgrounds. See Ackman, supra note
28.
63.
See Part II.A for a discussion of the relative legitimacy of the pool problem.
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The business rationales for diversity have several distinct, but
intertwining layers. All of the rationales suggest that diversity can have a
positive impact on the corporation, ultimately enhancing its profitability.
In fact, at least one study analyzing Fortune 1000 companies found a
positive correlation (although not causation) between the number of
women and people of color on a board and firm value.64 For ease of
understanding, this Article divides the business rationales into five
arguments. The first rationale argues that, given the diverse nature of the
population and its labor pool, corporations will need to attract diverse
individuals in order to continue growing and to remain competitive.
Second, by allowing corporations to respond better to an increasingly
diverse client and customer base, diversity may improve a corporation’s
position in the marketplace. Third, corporations with diversity on their
boards may be more sensitive to differences in the workforce, and hence
may be better equipped to prevent conflicts based on those differences,
which could lead to costly discrimination and harassment lawsuits.
Fourth, increasing diversity, particularly at the upper ranks, can have a
positive impact on employment relationships within the corporation,
reducing turnover and its associated costs while increasing productivity
and profitability. Fifth, increasing the number of directors of color may
enhance the quality of a board’s decision-making and monitoring
function. This Part critically examines each of these arguments.65
A.

The Talent Rationale

According to the talent rationale, given the diversity of the labor
pool, corporations should recognize that they must reach out to the entire
population, including its racial and ethnic members, in order to ensure
access to all talents and the corporation’s continued growth. Such a
rationale has two components. First, it recognizes that corporations will
not have access to an adequate pool of talented employees if they
continue to ignore large segments of the workforce. Indeed, people of
color comprise 29% of the population, and are expected to comprise
almost half of the population by 2050.66 In almost half of the nation’s
largest cities, people of color comprise a majority of the population.67
64.
CARTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 4. The study focuses on publicly traded
Fortune 1000 companies and on board characteristics for 1997. Id. at 9. The sample size
was 637 firms, and after controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance
measures, the study found a statistically significant positive relationship between the
number of women or people of color on a corporation’s board and firm value—measured
by Tobin’s q. See id. at 4, 10.
65.
This Article acknowledges that evaluating the rationales individually may
discount the strength of those rationales when viewed collectively.
66.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
67.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, while there are roughly five white people for every person of
color among Americans ages seventy and up, that ratio is two-to-one for
Americans forty and below, and 1.5 to 1 for Americans under ten years of
age.68 These figures reveal that the future population, and thus the future
workforce, will be more racially and ethnically diverse. In light of these
statistics, corporations unwilling to recruit employees from all
backgrounds may not be able to meet their future employment demands,
ultimately hampering their ability to expand.
Second, this argument recognizes that talent is not race specific. Not
only do people of color comprise a significant portion of the labor pool,
particularly in many of the nation’s largest cities, but the student
population at the undergraduate and graduate levels reflects increasing
levels of diversity. According to U.S. Department of Education statistics,
people of color accounted for 28% of the total enrollment at colleges and
universities in 2000.69 If these enrollment patterns remain consistent with
more general demographic trends, then people of color should account for
nearly half of the total college population by 2050.70 People of color
receive nearly 22% of all bachelor’s degrees and nearly 18% of all
master’s degrees.71
68.
See THE BUSINESS CASE FOR DIVERSITY: THE PROOF, THE STRATEGIES, AND
THE INDUSTRIES IN THE FRONT LINE 4 (DiversityInc.com ed., 3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter
BUSINESS CASE].
69.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATUS AND
TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS 92–93 (2003) [hereinafter TRENDS IN BLACK
EDUCATION], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003034.pdf. This study found
that in 2000, blacks accounted for 11% of the total enrollment at colleges and universities,
Hispanics accounted for 10%, Asians accounted for 6%, while Native Americans
accounted for 1%. See id. By contrast, in 1980, blacks accounted for 9% of total
enrollment at colleges and universities, Hispanics accounted for 4%, Asians accounted for
2%, and Native Americans accounted for 1%. See id. As these statistics reveal, every
ethnic group other than Native Americans experienced some increase in their college
enrollment. See id. The statistics also revealed a decrease in the percentage of white
students that comprised the total percentage of all students attending colleges and
universities, going from 81% in 1980 to 68% in 2000. Id. These percentages drive home
the point that the nation’s school population is becoming increasingly more diverse.
Interestingly, within all racial and ethnic groups (except nonresident aliens), women
account for more than half of the total percentage of people enrolled in colleges and
universities. Id. at 94. Thus, 56% of white students, 57% of Hispanic students, 52% of
Asian students, 63% of black students, and 59% of Native American students enrolled in
colleges and universities in 2000 were women. See id. at 95. These statistics also reveal
that black women account for a higher proportion of the total black student population
than any other group. Id. at 94.
70.
See id. at 6–7. Indeed, the percentage of people of color enrolled in colleges
and universities is roughly the same as their percentage in the population more generally.
Compare id. at 7, with id. at 93. Studies suggest that by 2050, such people will represent
nearly half of the population. See id. at 7. If student population patterns mirror general
population patterns, then by 2050, students of color may also represent nearly half of the
student population.
71.
Id. at 97. In the 1999 to 2000 academic school year, blacks earned 8.7% of
all bachelor’s degrees, Hispanics earned 6.1%, Asians earned 6.3%, and Native Americans
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Moreover, over the last twenty years, the greatest growth in
bachelor’s degrees among people of color occurred in business, increasing
by 182%,72 while the number of master’s degrees in business rose by
230%.73 A recent study revealed that degrees in business were by far the
most popular degree earned by people of color.74 These statistics suggest
that corporations that do not reach out to the entire population, including
its diverse segments, miss out on a huge talent pool. Ignoring such talent
has financial implications because doing so may prevent companies from
being as innovative as they could.75 Then too, corporations that overlook
portions of the nation’s talent pool may be at a competitive disadvantage
with those that do take advantage of such talent.76 Thus, increasing
diversity within corporations will not only enable corporations to tap new
sources of talent so that they can remain innovative and competitive with
other companies, but will also ensure that corporations maximize their
ability to hire new employees, thereby enabling these corporations to
continue to exist and expand.
The first component of the talent rationale appears to have
implications for all levels of the corporation, including its board. Indeed,
this rationale appears compelling because corporations depend upon
talented employees for their growth and success. Because the number of
board members is smaller than the number of corporate employees,
corporations may not ordinarily experience as many difficulties with
recruiting and retaining qualified individuals for board service as they will
earned 0.7%. Id. With respect to master’s degrees, blacks earned 7.8%, Hispanics earned
4.2%, Asians earned 5.0%, and Native Americans earned 0.5%. Id. The portion of white
women who finish is less than that of white men, while the opposite is true for black
women. See id. at 96, 165 supp. tbl.7.2.
72.
Press Release, Minority College Enrollment Surges Over the Past Two
Decades; Students of Color Still Lag Behind Whites in College Participation, available at
www.acenet.edu/AM/Template.cfm?Section+20032&Template+/CM/
ContentDisplaycfm&ContentID+3719.
73.
Id.
74.
While more master’s in education were earned than master’s in business, the
total number of degrees (both master’s and bachelor’s) in business represented the highest
category. See id. at 99, 101. Twenty-two percent of the bachelor’s degrees and 24% of
the master’s degrees earned by blacks were in business. Id. By contrast, degrees in social
studies and history, the next most popular bachelor’s degree, accounted for only 11% of
the total degrees conferred. Id. at 99.
75.
See CARTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 5 (noting that diversity sparks
innovation and creativity); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The
Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN.
L. REV. 925, 981 (1998) (noting that worker diversity fosters creativity and innovation);
Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 2, at 98 (noting leading business
leaders’ belief that diversity leads to profitability because it helps companies generate
innovative ideas).
76.
See Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that
diversity provides a competitive advantage in the escalating “‘war for talent’”) (quoting
Geoffrey Colvin, The 50 Best Companies for Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics, FORTUNE,
July 19, 1999, at 52, 52–57).
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encounter for employment. However, changes brought by reform
measures have made securing qualified directors, particularly outside
directors, more challenging for corporations.77 This challenge may
require corporations to recruit from a more diverse pool of directors than
they have traditionally. Moreover, the fact that people of color tend to be
outside independent directors strengthens the possibility that reforms will
lead to increases in the number of directors of color.78 In this regard, the
first component of the talent rationale appears to have applicability to
board diversity.
The second component of this rationale, however, while encouraging
corporations to diversify, may not have an impact on the overall number
of people of color who serve as directors. That is because the second
component presumes that corporations can gain a competitive advantage
by recruiting and retaining talented people of color who other
corporations will not be able to recruit and retain simultaneously.
However, unlike most other jobs, directors can, and routinely do, hold
multiple directorships.79 Because there is always the opportunity to
convince a director to serve on additional boards, corporations can share
whatever talent such directors bring. The empirical evidence on the high
percentages of people of color serving in multiple directorships
underscores this point.80 Moreover, the ability to share directors may not
only obviate the need to actively pursue additional candidates of color,
but also suggests that no one corporation obtains a competitive advantage
over another corporation. In this regard, the talent rationale may pressure
boards to diversify, but does not pressure them to move beyond the same
pool of board candidates—potentially undermining its net impact.
Reforms, particularly those disfavoring multiple directorships,
should have made sharing directors of color more difficult—thereby
reinvigorating the notion that some corporations can gain a competitive
advantage when they secure such directors. However, this difficulty has
not occurred. Instead, while post-Enron reforms and fear of liability have
prompted most people to reduce the number of boards on which they
serve,81 people of color apparently have retained the same number of

77.
See supra notes 42, 56 and accompanying text.
78.
It is possible that as more people of color enter higher ranks within
corporations, corporations may be able to recruit directors of color from inside their
corporate ranks, making the emphasis on outside directors less critical. However, given
the small number of people of color at the highest ranks within corporate America, this
possibility appears a long way off.
79.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
80.
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text (explaining the phenomenon
of multiple directorships unique to directors of color).
81.
See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 7; BLACK ET AL., supra note
37, at 1 & n.4.
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board memberships.82 For example, a 2003 Forbes magazine study of
S&P 500 companies revealed that, during the same time period that the
total number of directors holding five or more board seats dropped by
half,83 two black directors were also the only directors who served on
more than six boards.84 This suggests that reforms have not prevented
corporations from drawing on the same directors of color. This
continuing phenomenon reveals that the talent rationale may ensure that
the percentage of corporations with directors of color continues to rise,
without triggering a corresponding increase in the raw number of
directors who are called to serve.
More significantly, the second component of the talent rationale may
prove ineffective because it fails to address adequately whether a
sufficient number of people of color satisfy the criteria for being a board
member (at least as measured by the currently—admittedly limited—
criteria for board membership). Indeed, merely citing statistics—even
those suggesting that people of color comprise large segments of
graduates from colleges, universities, and business schools—may prove
insufficient in convincing corporations that ignoring diverse individuals
will impede their profitability. Instead, proponents must convince
corporate America that people of color satisfy the qualifications of the
specific jobs at issue. In other contexts, this “pool problem” represents a
significant hurdle because entities often claim that people of color do not
have the necessary qualifications to fulfill employment positions.85 This
claim enables corporations to argue that despite their desire to employ a

82.
See Virginia Citrano, Still Overworked, but Not As Much, FORBES.COM (July
11, 2003) (finding that only three individuals hold six or more directorships and two of
them are black), at http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/11/cx_vc_0711directors.html.
83.
Id. (finding that the number of directors serving on five or more boards
dropped from eighteen to nine).
84.
Id. (finding that Gray and Shirley each remain on eight boards).
85.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501–02 (1989)
(“[W]here special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to
undertake the particular task.”); see also Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 547
(1988) (discussing the pool problem in legal academia); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s
Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1362–64 (1992) (reviewing DINESH D’SOUZA, ILLIBERAL
EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991)); Daniel A. Farber, The
Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 918–24 (1994)
(discussing the pool problem in education and employment); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1813–14 (1989) (discussing the
pool problem in legal academia); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV.
493, 503–06 (1996) (discussing the pool problem, particularly for blacks, in corporate law
firms).

816

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

diverse workforce, there are no qualified candidates of color to fulfill that
desire.86
In the context of corporate boards, the pool problem may represent
an even greater obstacle because very few people of color (and, for that
matter, relatively few white people) appear to meet the qualifications of a
traditional board member.
Model statutes, for example, allow
corporations to prescribe the qualifications of their directors.87 Most
corporations give the nominating committee of the board the discretion to
nominate the candidates for directors.88 Changes in SEC and listing
requirements now limit that discretion, at least with regard to certain
committees.89 As Part I.B reveals, these changes require that directors
who serve on the audit committee have some financial background and
expertise.90 The Korn/Ferry study reported that corporations have
experienced difficulties in finding directors to meet these new
requirements.91 This difficulty may be particularly acute with regard to
directors of color. Indeed, as Part I.B demonstrates, studies show that a
very small portion of people of color hold the kinds of jobs traditionally
believed to provide expertise in financial matters.92 Because the number
of people of color serving in such positions may be limited, companies

86.
See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501–02 (“[W]here special qualifications are
necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.”);
see also Chused, supra note 85, at 547 (discussing the pool problem in legal academia);
Delgado, supra note 85, at 1362–64; Farber, supra note 85, at 918–24 (discussing the pool
problem in education and employment); Kennedy, supra note 85, at 1813–14 (discussing
the pool problem in legal academia); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 85, at 503–06
(discussing the pool problem in corporate law firms).
87.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2002) (allowing corporations to identify
requirements for directors in their articles of incorporation or their bylaws).
88.
See SECTION OF BUS. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, Corporate Director’s
Guidebook, in 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1608 (3d ed. 2001) (describing nominating committee
functions). The New York Stock Exchange requires that each listed company have a
nominating committee that considers director candidates. See FINAL NYSE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
RULES
7–8
(2003),
available
at
http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. By contrast, the SEC requires companies to disclose whether
they have a nominating committee, and if not, why they believe it appropriate not to have
one, as well as the names of directors who participate in nominating candidates. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(7)(d)(1), (7)(d)(2)(i). Since Sarbanes-Oxley, the percentage of
corporations with formal nominating committees has increased from 87% in 2003 to 96%
in 2004. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 12. This represents an increase
from 73% in 1995. Id. at 13.
89.
See supra Part I.B (noting new changes requiring that the majority of the
board be independent and that directors of the nominating and audit committees be
independent as well).
90.
See supra Part I.B.
91.
See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 35–37.
92.
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 58, at 44 (revealing a small number of people of
color holding financial offices in Fortune 500 companies); see also supra Part I.B.
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seeking such individuals to qualify as financially literate may find the
pool of available candidates to be relatively small.
The pool also may be deemed small with respect to other traditional
criteria. Outside of the requirements for audit committees, the nominating
committee continues to have discretion in determining the type of people
who they nominate for a directorship. Traditionally, however, such
committees have drawn from a very elite pool—tending to select people
who are CEOs or former CEOs of major corporations. Indeed, retired
executives represent the most prevalent type of director: 95% of
corporations have such a director.93 Not many people of color fit this
profile. In fact, there are only three black people serving as a CEO of a
Fortune 500 company, and there have been only eight in total.94 Then
too, a 2002 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission report
revealed that minorities hold only 15.2% of the total management
positions in the private sector.95
Moreover, a 2004 study revealed that black women hold just 5.1% of
the nation’s total professional, managerial, and related jobs, and only
1.6% of corporate officer positions at Fortune 500 companies.96 It is
worth noting that these percentages, while small, do suggest that the
available talent pool of people of color is greater than the current
representation within corporate boards suggests, and hence that
corporations should do a better job of reaching out to them. That being
said, these statistics do create difficulties for the validity of the talent
rationale. In 2004, 37% of corporations claimed to have experienced
difficulty finding any directors with the requisite management
experience.97 This difficulty may be augmented with regard to directors
of color. From this perspective, the pool of diverse candidates appears
significantly smaller than the statistics regarding demographics suggest.
Of course, corporations and their boards may appear disingenuous
when they argue that the pool problem represents a legitimate hurdle to
increasing board diversity. This is because while there may be specific

93.
94.
95.

2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 11.
See Lewis, supra note 60.
See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY BY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP/SEX, AND BY INDUSTRY,
UNITED STATES, 2002 (2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2002/us.html.
96.
CATALYST, ADVANCING AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE:
CATALYST’S
NEW
GUIDE
FOR
MANAGERS
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.catalystwomen.org/bookstore/perspective/04may.pdf; CATALYST, STATISTICAL
OVERVIEW OF WOMEN AND DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE, available at
http://www.catalystwomen.org/services/ic/files/Quick%20Takes%20-%20Statistical%20
Overview.pdf [hereinafter CATALYST, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW]. This is compared to
women generally who hold 15.7% of corporate officer positions at Fortune 500
companies. CATALYST, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, supra.
97.
2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 35.
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criteria for jobs that people of color cannot meet in other contexts,98
corporate statutes do not impose definitive criteria in the context of board
members other than those related to audit committee members.99 Hence,
corporations are not bound by any specific criteria when selecting board
members; they are free to select members who have different experiences
and backgrounds. This suggests that the pool for board candidates is
narrow only because corporations have chosen to confine their search to a
relatively narrow base. It may also suggest a need for ensuring that
people of color serve on nominating committees to encourage
corporations to take a broader view of the talent pool.
However, as a practical matter, corporations do not extend their
board search beyond a very elite base. Hence, when corporations do not
select chief executives, they gravitate toward former government officials
or academics.
Consistently, 58% of corporations have former
government officials on their boards, and 58% of corporations have
academics on their boards.100 Then too, of the top ten Fortune 500
companies,101 generally only one or two members of the entire board—
which range from ten to sixteen members—are not current or former top
executives or officers of major companies.102 In fact, one company’s
98.
See Farber, supra note 85, at 920 (discussing the small percentage of
recipients (less than 2%) of scientific Ph.D.s that are black); see also Kennedy, supra note
85, at 1814 (discussing the pool problem in legal academia).
99.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a101(7)(d)(2)(H) (allowing corporations and nominating committees to proscribe criteria
for director candidates); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02.
100. 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 12.
101. See Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 5, 2004, at B1
(listing the top ten Fortune 500 companies as: (1) Wal-Mart Stores, (2) Exxon Mobil, (3)
General Motors, (4) Ford Motor, (5) General Electric, (6) ChevronTexaco, (7)
ConocoPhillips, (8) Citigroup, (9) International Business Machines, and (10) American
International Group).
102. See AM. INT’L GROUP, INC., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION: PROXY
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at
2–5 (SEC File No. 001-08787, Apr. 5, 2004) (listing one attorney, one former government
official, one academic, and one head of a charitable organization out of fifteen directors),
available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; CHEVRONTEXACO CORP., SCHEDULE 14A:
PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at 6–9 (SEC File No. 001-00368, Mar. 26, 2004) (listing one attorney, one
academic, and one head of a charitable organization out of twelve board members),
available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; CITIGROUP INC., SCHEDULE 14A
INFORMATION: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 13–21 (SEC File No. 001-09924, Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter
CITIGROUP PROXY STATEMENT] (listing one academic-consultant, one academic-former
government official, and two other former government officials out of sixteen directors),
available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; CONOCOPHILLIPS, SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at
7–9 (SEC File No. 000-49987, Mar. 31, 2004) (listing one academic and three former
government
officials
out
of
sixteen
board
members),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; EXXON MOBIL CORP., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION:
PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
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entire eleven-member board consisted of people who were heads or
former heads of major entities.103 Within the remaining nine companies,
eight companies had one or more academics, four companies had one law
firm partner, and three companies had one or more former federal
government officials, including one former U.S. president.104 Like CEOs,
there are not significant numbers of people of color within these
categories.105 Thus, while the fact that corporations have flexibility in
determining board characteristics may weaken the legitimacy of the pool
1934, at 7–10 (SEC File No. 001-02256, Apr. 14, 2004) (listing two academics out of
eleven board members), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; FORD MOTOR CO.,
SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 5–9 (SEC File No. 001-03950, Apr. 8, 2004) (listing two
academics out of sixteen board members), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml;
GEN. ELEC. CO., SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 6–11 (SEC File No. 001-00035, Mar. 2, 2004)
(listing two academics and one attorney out of fifteen board members), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; GEN. MOTORS CORP., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION:
PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at 8–10 (SEC File No. 001-00043, Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter GM PROXY
STATEMENT] (noting that all eleven board members head or did head major corporations),
available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; INT’L BUS. MACHS. CORP., SCHEDULE 14A:
PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at 5–7 (SEC File No. 001-02360, Mar. 8, 2004) (listing two academics and one head
of a charitable organization out of twelve directors), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; WAL-MART STORES, INC., SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at
2–4 (SEC File No. 001-06991, Apr. 15, 2004) (listing one attorney out of fourteen board
members), available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
103. See GM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 102, at 8–10 (noting that all eleven
board members head major corporations).
104. See supra note 102. Former President Gerald Ford, in addition to a former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, sits on the board of Citigroup, Incorporated.
See CITIGROUP PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 102, at 21.
105. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. & ECON. STUD., BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY (2001) (noting that from 2001 to 2002, only thirtynine federal office holders were black), available at http://www.jointcenter.org; Chused,
supra note 85, at 538 (noting a 1986 to 1987 study finding that blacks accounted for 3.7%
of faculty members at majority operated law schools); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 85
(demonstrating the lack of black lawyers at corporate law firms); Ann Davis, Big Jump in
Minority Associates, But . . ., NAT’L L.J., Apr. 29, 1996, at A1, A21 (noting a 1996 survey
showing that blacks accounted for 2.4% of lawyers in majority white law firms and 1.2%
of the partners); Wendy Killeen, For Colleges, Faculty Diversity Becomes Single-Minded
Goal, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2005, at 1 (discussing the lack of faculty diversity at
colleges); Susan Page, Bush Is Opening Doors with a Diverse Cabinet, USA TODAY, Dec.
10, 2004, at 17A (noting that before President Clinton, cabinet positions were almost
exclusively the province of white males, and that prior to President Bush, “no person of
color had been named to any of the four most prestigious Cabinet jobs”); cf. Terry M.
Neal, Diversity and the Bush Cabinet, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Dec. 23, 2004),
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NTQ/is_2004_Dec_23/ai_n9510490 (noting
that out of twenty-four appointments, President George W. Bush named four blacks, three
Latinos, and two Asians to his cabinet; and out of twenty-nine cabinet appointments,
President William Clinton named seven blacks, three Latinos, and one Asian).
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problem as a criticism of the talent rationale, as a practical matter, the
kind of candidates that boards select encourages corporations to view the
number of available candidates of color as relatively narrow.
This Section reveals that the talent rationale may foster diversity, but
only in a limited manner. The diversity of the nation’s population appears
to lend validity to that aspect of the talent rationale recognizing that
corporations will need to recruit and retain more diverse individuals if
they want to maintain and grow their employment base, including their
directorships. However, because corporations may have a greater ability
to share board members, rationales that rely upon notions of competitive
advantages may not lead to an increase in the overall number of directors
of color.
Moreover, the apparent lack of qualified candidates may undermine
the legitimacy of the talent rationale. From this perspective, whether the
talent rationale can compel corporations to actively recruit directors of
color depends upon both corporations’ perception of the pool problem and
their willingness to expand their criteria in a manner that encompasses a
broader segment of the population. Given the current data on board
members of color, and the continued trend of multiple directorships
related to such members, as long as only a few people of color continue to
meet the traditional characteristics of board members, then the general
demographics of the labor pool may have only a limited impact on
corporations’ desire to reach out to a more diverse candidate pool.
B.

The Market Rationale

According to the market rationale, corporations that employ diverse
individuals will reach a broader range of customers and clients, thereby
increasing their sales performance and ultimate profitability. Indeed, this
appears to be one of the key contentions of Grutter, and the briefs that
underlie it.106 These arguments suggest that such market outreach can be
achieved in at least two ways. First, corporations with people of color in
management and on the board will more effectively market existing
products and services in a manner that attracts diverse populations.107
Second, those corporations will be better equipped to identify and develop
new products and services aimed at the particular needs or interests of

106. See, e.g., 65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 7 (noting
that a diverse group of individuals “are better able . . . to market offerings in ways that
appeal to [a variety of] consumers”).
107. See Dallas, supra note 2, at 1385 (stating that many directors believe diverse
boards will “‘better reflect the changing marketplace and the growth in minority market
segments’”) (quoting KORN/FERRY INT’L, 26TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY
1999, at 13 (1999)).
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diverse communities.108 Because corporations with diverse individuals
can employ these strategies, they will be able to increase their financial
position in the marketplace.
Certainly, there is some reason to believe that a corporation’s ability
to market its products to, and develop new products for, diverse
customers and clients, and thereby increase its profitability, may depend
on its ability to understand and appreciate a diverse client and customer
base. One recent study revealed that people of color comprise 18% of
U.S. buying power, and the growth in the spending of African American
consumers has outpaced that of white consumers.109 Other, albeit limited,
research revealed that market strategies aimed specifically at particular
communities are more effective than marketing efforts aimed at a general
audience.110
For example, that research demonstrates that advertising in Spanish
or on Spanish language television serves to attract more Latino customers
than English language advertisements.111 Similarly, some companies
found that marketing directed at communities of color increases sales
from people within those communities. Car companies such as Ford
Motor Company (“Ford”) and Volvo Group (“Volvo”) have worked
108. See 65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that a
diverse group of individuals “are better able to develop products and services that appeal
to a variety of consumers”).
109. See Jordan T. Pine, Buying Power of African Americans to Reach $682
Billion by 2006 (Nov. 27, 2001), reprinted in BUSINESS CASE, supra note 68, at 75, 75
(noting that U.S. buying power is expected to reach $7.1 trillion in 2001, and that African
Americans comprise $572.1 billion of buying power). The fact that blacks represent a
significant portion of the buying power may ensure that corporations pay heed to
communities of color irrespective of the diversity within their corporate ranks. Moreover,
those communities can exert pressure on corporations to diversify through the giving or
withholding of their market power. In a similar strategy, some corporations have refused
to do business with law firms that are not diverse. See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Falling
Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law Firms, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 785, 794 &
n.71 (2003); J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black
Lawyer Sit at Our Table”, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2003); David B. Wilkins, Do
Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 856 (1998). This strategy appears to be based less on
economic justifications than on moral rationales about the importance of working with a
diverse team.
110. See ROSLOW RESEARCH GROUP, SPANISH VS. ENGLISH ADVERTISING
EFFECTIVENESS AMONG HISPANIC TEENS 2 (2000) [hereinafter ROSLOW, SPANISH VS.
ENGLISH] (noting the effectiveness of advertising to Hispanics in Spanish), available at
http://www.roslowresearch.com/home.htm; Roslow Research Group, Case Histories, at
http://www.roslowresearch.com/home.htm (detailing successful marketing strategies
aimed at the Hispanic community) (last visited July 29, 2005) [hereinafter Roslow, Case
Histories]. In addition, 70% of Korean and Chinese Americans prefer advertising in their
own languages. See Jordan T. Pine, How To Reach a Third of Your Future Customers
(Nov. 6, 2001), reprinted in BUSINESS CASE, supra note 68, at 71, 72.
111. See generally ROSLOW, SPANISH VS. ENGLISH, supra note 110; Roslow, Case
Histories, supra note 110.
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closely with companies that specialize in developing advertisement
campaigns and products aimed at blacks and Latinos.112 Apparently, as a
result, the total dollars spent on cars within the black community has
nearly doubled since 1996,113 and Ford is the number one car company in
the Latino market in terms of car sales.114 This anecdotal evidence
suggests that identifying appropriate advertising strategies and products
that will attract an increasingly diverse customer base requires an
awareness of diversity issues.
Then too, a corporation’s ability to take advantage of the buying
power within communities of color may require them to actively combat
stereotypes regarding those communities. Directors of color may be
helpful in this endeavor. Indeed, a 1996 study prepared for the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) found several instances of
discriminatory practices in the advertising industry.115 These practices
stemmed, in part, from incorrect stereotypes regarding consumers of
color.116 Having people of color in management and on the board who
can counteract these stereotypes may prove useful for ensuring that such
practices do not continue.117 This, in turn, may ensure that those
stereotypes do not impede corporations’ ability to benefit from the buying
power of people of color.
First, this rationale may be flawed because corporations do not
necessarily need to have directors of color on their board in order to take
advantage of the economic opportunities embedded in the market
rationale. Instead, corporations can hire marketing firms, specifically
marketing firms with people of color in them, which can assist them in
developing strategies for reaching diverse communities. Indeed, this is
precisely what Ford and Volvo did when they launched their campaign to

112. See Yoji Cole, Faltering PC Makers Could Learn Marketing Lesson from
Mature Auto Industry (Jan. 11, 2002), reprinted in BUSINESS CASE, supra note 68, at 82,
82; Eric L. Hinton, The Black Middle Class: When Will Growing Economic Clout Bring
Respect?, reprinted in BUSINESS CASE, supra note 68, at 37, 37–38.
113. See Hinton, supra note 112, at 38 (explaining that the total dollars spent on
new and used cars by blacks has risen from $22 million to $43.2 million); Pine, supra note
109, at 76.
114. See Cole, supra note 112, at 83.
115. See KOFI ASIEDU OFORI, CIVIL RIGHTS FORUM ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY,
WHEN BEING NO. 1 IS NOT ENOUGH: THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING PRACTICES ON
MINORITY-OWNED & MINORITY-FORMATTED BROADCAST STATIONS 11–13, 25–31 (2002)
(noting the prevalence of “no Urban/Spanish dictates,” whereby an advertiser or agency
does not allow commercials to be aired on stations that program primarily to black or
Latino communities, regardless of ratings or consumption patterns), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Informal/ad-study/.
116. See id. at 12. Some examples include perceptions that black people do not
buy linens. See id. at 26. Others include perceptions that Latinos do not bathe as
frequently as non-Latinos. Id. at 37.
117. Cf. id. at 38 (noting that advertising agencies tend to be all white and hence
do not understand people of color).
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target specific ethnic communities.118 The fact that this resource is
available to corporations may obviate the need for corporations to seek
out directors of color for the purpose of tapping diverse markets.
Moreover, given that directors may not have marketing background or
experience and marketing firms do have such expertise, utilizing those
firms may be more effective than reliance on directors of color. From this
perspective, while the market rationale underscores the economic
importance of accessing diverse markets, that rationale may prove
insufficient in demonstrating that corporations need to recruit directors of
color in order for that access to occur.
Second, even assuming that directors of color can play a role in
marketing, that role may be much more limited than the market rationale
suggests. Certainly, corporate directors engage in strategic planning, and
in this capacity they may play a role in ensuring that the corporation
targets particular communities or develops policies for doing so.119 This
role should not be minimized because the FCC study revealed that some
companies often fail to market their products in a manner designed to
reach diverse audiences—even when the qualitative data indicates that
people of color spend amounts of money similar to whites on such
products.120 If directors of color can be instrumental in prompting
corporations to adopt targeted marketing strategies, this rationale has
some legitimacy.
However, the role of directors in the corporation may prevent them
from significantly contributing to the marketing of products and services
or otherwise being involved with the development of their company’s
marketing or production strategies. Indeed, the market rationale appears
more appropriate in the context of employees and executives who interact
with clients and customers, or who are responsible for defining the
marketing and production strategies of the corporation. Yet, many board
members do not have such interaction or responsibility.121 Instead, in
many corporations, directors serve primarily as monitors who do not get
involved with product development or sales campaigns, and hence their
primary role encompasses accepting or rejecting policies already
established by management and their employees.122 For board members
118. See Cole, supra note 112, at 82; Hinton, supra note 112, at 38.
119. Thus, it is reported that when Jill Kerr Conway was the sole female director
at Nike, she told her fellow directors that the company should launch a female sportsapparel division, which now accounts for a significant segment of Nike’s overall revenue.
Hymowitz, supra note 23.
120. See OFORI, supra note 115, at 11–13 (noting the refusal of certain luxury car
companies to consider placing ads on urban formatted radio stations); id. at 25–31; see
also id. at 33 (noting that certain “upscale” products and services such as insurance, banks,
financial services, and tourism destinations are not advertised to black people).
121. See Fisch, supra note 44, at 284–86 (noting that the extent to which
corporations require their boards to engage in decision-making varies from firm to firm).
122. See Fisch, supra note 44, at 284–86.
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who serve on these monitoring boards, their limited role may not enable
them to shape corporate policies regarding marketing strategies,
undermining their ability to contribute to a corporation’s marketing
efforts. In this way, the market rationale may be too simplistic because it
fails to appreciate the role of board members.
The market rationale may also rest on illegitimate stereotypes
regarding communities of color, which detracts from its validity. To the
extent the market rationale recognizes the buying power of people of
color and, based on that recognition, highlights the importance of
ensuring that corporations include communities of color in their
advertising campaigns to achieve maximum profitability, this argument
seems sound.
However, the argument becomes more suspect to the extent that it
implies that people of color need advertising or products distinctly
different from white Americans. Certainly, some of the admittedly
limited studies suggest that communities of color respond to targeted
advertising.123 Yet, these studies can be interpreted in different ways.
Because these studies suggest that targeted advertising can be effective
when aimed at people whose first or primary language is not English,
such accounts may be interpreted to mean that advertising is more
effective when it is given in a language customers can more readily
understand.124 Such an interpretation seems both reasonable and obvious.
Then too, the apparent effectiveness of targeted campaigns may simply
suggest that people of color are more likely to purchase products where
advertisements include people who look like them. The broader
interpretation that corporations must alter the content of their
advertisements or the nature of their products and services in order to
appeal to an “ethnic” audience, while applicable for some products like
hair products, may not be applicable for others such as cars or clothing.
Products or services that stem from this belief play into stereotypes about
people of color, and, because they are based on those stereotypes, they
may ultimately prove ineffective. In fact, this belief ignores class
differences among people of color, which may constitute a stronger
influence on their consumer needs than their racial or ethnic identity.
Thus, the market rationale has both strengths and weaknesses,
suggesting that proponents may have exaggerated the extent to which
directors could achieve the claims underlying the rationale. For example,
it is possible that securing directors of color may allow corporations to
reach different markets and ultimately enhance their profitability. It is
also possible that such directors can counteract discriminatory marketing
practices that inhibit profit-making.

123. See supra notes 112–14 (defining studies with Ford and Volvo).
124. See OFORI, supra note 115, at 12 (noting that language barriers may be one
reason for decreased advertising on stations with Latino audiences).
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Unfortunately, there are some stumbling blocks to realizing these
possibilities.125 First, this rationale may not provide a compelling reason
for corporations to diversify their boards because corporations have other,
possibly more effective, means of securing the economic benefits of
marketing to people of color. Second, the market rationale may be
inapplicable to board members who engage mainly in monitoring officers
and overseeing corporate policies because it inaccurately presumes that
those members actively engage in marketing and product development.
Third, this rationale may rely on illegitimate stereotypes that ultimately
undermine its saliency.
C.

The Litigation Rationale

There is tremendous appeal in the notion that enhancing board
diversity will prevent the number, or decrease the severity, of costly
discrimination suits. High profile cases regarding racial discrimination in
the workforce such as those involving Texaco, Incorporated (“Texaco”)
and the Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”), which resulted in
settlements of $176.1 million and $192.5 million respectively, certainly
demonstrate the economic impact that such discrimination can have on a
corporation.126
If board diversity could serve to prevent such costs, it would provide
a strong incentive to anyone concerned with the corporation’s bottom
line. Some shareholders appear to believe that board diversity has this
125. There is another presumption embedded in the market rationale that arguably
could undermine its viability. The crux of the market rationale appears to be that
corporations need an awareness of diversity in order to take advantage of the spending
power within diverse communities. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Grutter opinion
appears to rest on the notion that a diverse school population is important precisely
because it fosters a recognition and understanding of diversity by everyone within that
population. 539 U.S. at 330. In other words, such diversity ensures that whites appreciate
differences, and as a consequence enables them to navigate more effectively diverse
communities both within and outside of the business world. From this perspective, if
someone is educated or trained to appreciate diversity, this appreciation should make her
as effective as a person of color in reaching out to other communities. The logical
progression of such a rationale suggests that people of color—and subsequently
corporations’ need to recruit or retain people of color—may lose their utility when and if
this appreciation does occur. In this way, the presumption that people of all races can gain
an appreciation and understanding of diversity through education and exposure may
obviate the need for corporations to hire people of color in order to obtain the benefits of
diversity. At present, this argument against the marketing rationale is not that powerful
because we do not appear to have reached this level of appreciation, and in fact may be
moving backwards. Moreover, this argument may presume that appreciation is static and
fixed, whereas it is more likely derived from ongoing life experiences as a member of a
particular group.
126. See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social
Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1468–69 (2002)
(discussing these and other racial discrimination lawsuits against large corporations).
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preventative value. As an example, after its settlement, Texaco’s proxy
statement included a shareholder proposal calling for greater diversity on
the board, suggesting that such diversity might have been able to alleviate
the discrimination that took place at Texaco.127 As the proposal stated,
“[t]he loss of $170 million in discrimination settlements . . . strongly
underscores Texaco’s need for expanded diversity on [its] Board.”128
These shareholders appear to agree with the notion that diverse boards
can help to prevent or decrease employment conflicts and the subsequent
costs related to those conflicts. Even the signers of one of the Grutter
briefs appear to support the litigation rationale, noting that individuals
educated in a diverse environment “are likely to contribute to a positive
work environment, by decreasing incidents of discrimination and
stereotyping.”129
However, neither the empirical nor the anecdotal evidence appears to
support the presumption that enhanced board diversity correlates with
reduced incidents of discrimination among employees and their
corresponding lawsuits. In the cases of Texaco and Coca-Cola, both
corporations had an African American board member during the time that
the allegations related to racial harassment surfaced.130 Moreover, those
members were present when what many described as inappropriate
responses took place.131 This suggests that there are limits to such
individuals’ effectiveness. As Part II.E discusses in greater detail, these
limits may relate to the fact that many boards do not have a critical mass
of people of color, and this mass is important to ensure that such directors
feel comfortable voicing (especially controversial) opinions about race or
diversity.132 Then too, it appears that even while diversity within
management and boards has grown, the number and level of severity of

127. See TEXACO, INC., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION: PROXY STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 26 (SEC File
No. 001-00027, Mar. 27, 1997) [hereinafter TEXACO PROXY STATEMENT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
128. Id. at 26. The proposal further noted that “[w]hile Texaco has one woman
and one African American on its Board, we believe the recent scandal and legal settlement
highlight the need for additional Board members.” Id.
129. See 65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 7.
130. See COCA-COLA CO., SCHEDULE 14A: PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 9 (SEC File No. 001-02217,
Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter COCA-COLA PROXY STATEMENT] (noting that Donald F.
McHenry, an African American, has been a director of Coca-Cola since 1981), available
at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; TEXACO PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 127, at 10
(noting that Franklyn G. Jenifer, an African American, had served on the board since
1993).
131. See COCA-COLA PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 130, at 9 (showing that
McHenry was on the board through at least 2004); TEXACO PROXY STATEMENT, supra note
127, at 10 (showing that Jenifer was on the board through at least 1997); see also Wade,
supra note 126, at 1465.
132. See infra notes 201–02.

2005:795

The Bottom Line on Board Diversity

827

discrimination and harassment suits within the workforce have gone up.133
This suggests that board diversity has had no appreciable impact on
employee conflict, undermining the validity of the litigation rationale.
Indeed, that rationale may be flawed because it fails to realistically
address and acknowledge the conflicts created by diversity within the
workforce, instead suggesting that directors of color can manage those
conflicts on their own. Studies of increased racial conflict merely reflect
the practical reality that when entities bring together people of different
racial groups, there is bound to be conflict based on lack of
understanding.134 In this regard, such studies reveal that corporations
have not done a sufficient job of managing diversity. Managing diversity
refers to the idea that in order for diversity to prove effective,
corporations must provide “proactive attention” to diversity issues and
create a climate in which all members of the corporation can work
effectively.135
A University of Michigan study funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Glass Ceiling Commission concluded that while the presence of
diversity offered opportunities, “[u]nless the effects of diversity are well
managed, turnover, miscommunication, and interpersonal conflict may
increase leading to lower productivity and ultimately lower performance
on profit, market share or other strategic goals.”136 According to the
study, corporations must be willing to alter their culture to embrace
differing perspectives and must be able to respond to those
perspectives.137 Certainly, directors of color can play a role in helping to
develop that response. However, they cannot be the sole source of such
response. Indeed, the Michigan study makes clear that in order to manage
diversity, corporations must alter their culture, rather than just add diverse
people—even board members—to that culture.138
This study suggests that the litigation rationale is flawed because it
deemphasizes the role the entire corporation—as opposed to individual
directors of color—must play in managing diversity. Then too, the
133. Thus, charges of racial harassment filed with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have increased fivefold in the past decade. According
to EEOC statistics, the total number of harassment charges filed based on race went from
9757 in the fiscal years from 1980 to 1989, to 47,175 in the fiscal years from 1990 to
1999. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Trends in Harassment Charges
Filed with the EEOC, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.html (last
modified July 22, 2004).
134. See id.; see also TAYLOR COX, JR. & CAROL SMOLINSKI, MANAGING
DIVERSITY AND GLASS CEILING INITIATIVES AS NATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES 14
(Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 9410-01, 1994) (discussing enhanced conflicts),
available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/
GlassCeilingBackground5ManagingDiversity.pdf.
135. See COX & SMOLINSKI, supra note 134, at 6.
136. See id. at 14.
137. See id. at 6–7.
138. See id. at 1, 6–7.
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litigation rationale fails to appreciate the significant time and resources
associated with managing diversity. Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati have emphasized the importance of acknowledging the
“transaction costs” associated with managing diversity.139 These costs
include the expenses of implementing diversity training and programs as
well as the possibility that the results—to the extent they can be
reached—may only be realized over the long term.140 As Carbado and
Gulati note, these costs strengthen employers’ incentives to pursue
homogeneity.141 Hence, the litigation rationale may be flawed because it
ignores the importance of managing diversity (and the expense associated
with such management), suggesting that directors of color can provide a
“quick fix” to a corporation’s diversity conflicts.
Given its defects, the litigation rationale appears ill-suited as a
justification for enhancing board diversity. At best, increased board
diversity may represent an important first step toward implementing a
system designed to manage diversity as well as an important signal of a
corporation’s commitment to diversity, particularly when that corporation
has been embroiled in litigation that casts doubt on such a commitment.
At worst, however, it may be a symbolic tool, enabling corporations to
provide the illusion of diversity without grappling with the difficult
transaction costs associated with making that illusion a reality.
D. The Employee Relations Rationale
Almost as a corollary to the litigation rationale, some contend that
diversity may serve to enhance a corporation’s ability to work with its
diverse employment population.142 Indeed, the corporations that signed
onto one of the Grutter briefs put forth this rationale.143 Under this view,
because managers of color can understand their employees of color, those
managers will more likely adopt, or facilitate the adoption of, policies and

139. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1798–1802 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)).
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati emphasize the importance of recognizing the
transaction costs associated with managing diversity within the workplace to critical race
theorists because it gives employers strong incentives not to diversify their workforce—
that incentives are not motivated by racial animus. See id. at 1802.
140. See id. at 1800, 1802.
141. See id. at 1802.
142. The notion that directors will be able to prevent conflicts resulting from their
diverse workforce can also be considered an aspect of the employee relations rationale, but
for ease of discussion, this Article treats them as two separate (although clearly
overlapping) rationales.
143. 65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 7 (“[A] racially
diverse group of managers with cross-cultural experience is better able to work with
business partners, employees, and clientele in the United States and around the world.”).
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practices that increase employee satisfaction.144
Such enhanced
satisfaction has an economic benefit because it ultimately leads to greater
productivity and profitability for corporations.145
Because this rationale rests on the ability of people in the upper
ranks of the corporation to set policies reflecting the concerns of all
employees, this rationale appears to have importance for directors.
Indeed, Professor Lynne Dallas notes that boards have a relational role
and that diversity enhances this role by enabling board members and thus
the corporation to better relate to its employees, shareholders, and other
corporate constituents.146 Some studies, which focus on both gender and
racial-ethnic diversity, confirm that such diversity at the upper levels may
facilitate better understanding of diverse employees, generating policies
that enhance their performance and overall productivity. These studies
reveal that corporations with high percentages of women in senior
management and on the board are more likely to have policies related to
part-time work, maternity and paternity leave, and other “family friendly”
measures.147 Such policies have a financial impact. Indeed, several
studies showed that employees with supportive workplaces are the most
satisfied with their jobs and the most loyal, which leads to reduced
turnover among workers as well as a reduction in the costs related to such
turnover.148
However, like the market rationale, this argument may be
inapplicable to the majority of directors who do not interact with
employees in ways that make their diversity relevant. Many directors do
not have a significant voice in the creation and implementation of
employment policies. Hence, while this argument may seem particularly
relevant for people in management positions, it may be inapplicable for
directors.
Of course, there may be a symbolic importance to having people of
color in positions of authority. For example, having people of color as
managers may reveal the attainability of such positions to people of color
who comprise the rank and file—negating the existence of a “glass
ceiling” for employees.149 If employees believe in the attainability of
144. See id.
145. See infra note 148.
146. Dallas, supra note 44, at 800; Dallas, supra note 2, at 1384–85 (“The
movement to have diversity on corporate boards is intended to sensitize the corporation to
the interests of employees and consumers in an increasingly diverse, global society.”).
147. See Bus. for Soc. Responsibility, Work-Life Quality, available at
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.Cfm?DocumentID=50965 (last visited
May 30, 2005) (citing various studies).
148. See id.; see also James K. Harter et al., Business-Unit-Level Relationship
Between Employee Satisfaction, Employee Engagement and Business Outcomes: A MetaAnalysis, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 268, 273–74 (2002).
149. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate
Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1666–
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higher-level positions, corporations may experience less turnover and
have a better ability to recruit and retain their workforce, which in turn
may positively impact the corporation’s bottom line.150 However, even if
valid, this argument applies with less force to corporate boards. Because
board members do not normally interact with company employees,
employees may be unaware of the composition of their company’s board.
Thus, their symbolic importance to those employees appears to be
diminished.
With regard to recruitment and retention, having people of color in
executive positions undoubtedly sends a powerful statement to those
people of color in the corporation assessing their potential for
advancement.151 This statement not only influences their decision to join
the corporation, but may also influence their decision to remain with the
corporation.152 However, because corporations select—and, in fact, are
now required to select—the majority of their board members from outside
of the corporation, having people of color on the board may not serve as a
symbol that employees can ascend to such a position in the same way that
having diversity at the executive level does. In this regard, board
membership may not even have symbolic value for employees.
Then too, this rationale may inappropriately presume that directors
of color will be able to understand the concerns of employees of color.
Currently, directors of color are drawn from a socioeconomic class and
background similar to their white counterparts, and different from the
majority of American employees including employees of color.153 The
employee relations rationale presumes that despite this difference,
directors of color will be able to understand the concerns of such
employees. Part II.E addresses in more detail the flaws with this kind of
presumption.
The employee rationale appears particularly problematic when
viewed in the context of board functions. In essence, because many board
members have limited roles in shaping policies as well as limited
interactions with employees, their ability to meaningfully contribute to
employee policies—even in a symbolic way—may also be limited.

68 (2004) (noting that people of color in management positions allow others in the rank in
file to imagine themselves in such positions).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. (“[T]he presence of people of color at the top of the corporation sends
a positive message to people of color at the bottom that they, too, can ascend the corporate
hierarchy.”).
153. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 612 (1982); James J. Fishman, The Development of
Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 675 n.291
(1985); see also Sarra, supra note 2, at 487 (discussing a similar occurrence among female
directors).
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The Governance Rationale

Some have argued that having directors of color enhances the quality
of a board’s decision-making and monitoring functions. By statute, all
corporate powers must be managed by, or be under the direction of, the
board of directors.154 This management responsibility essentially involves
two functions, a decision-making function and an oversight function.155
The decision-making role requires that directors act in good faith and
make decisions that they “reasonably believ[e] to be in the best interests
of the corporation.”156 In order to satisfy this requirement, directors must
make decisions only after they have gained sufficient familiarity with
contemplated transactions by considering all relevant information or data
pertaining to those transactions.157
Most social and psychological data on group dynamics suggest that
having a diverse group of directors will facilitate a board’s decisionmaking function because that data reveals that heterogeneous groups tend
to make higher quality decisions.158 Social and psychological research
studies on group dynamics reveal that in making decisions, individuals
are restricted by their own perspective, which is a product of their
background characteristics.159
When in groups, these combined
perspectives determine the kind and quality of the decisions the groups
ultimately make.160 When group members all have the same perspective,
it limits the range of information they have and the issues they
consider.161 Homogenous groups also suffer from polarization, which

154. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, supra note 87, § 8.01 (requiring, subject to
certain limitations, that each corporation have a board of directors, and that all corporate
powers be managed or directed by the board).
155. See id. § 8.31 cmt. f.
156. See id. § 8.30(a).
157. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (noting that
directors breach their duty when they make decisions without informing themselves of all
relevant information); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that
directors must inform themselves “of all material information reasonably available to
them” prior to making a decision); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J.
1981) (stating that directors must pay attention to financial and business information when
discharging their duty).
158. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 5; Taylor H. Cox et al., Effects of
Ethnic Group Cultural Differences on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group
Task, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 827, 839 (1991); Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason,
Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 193 (1984); Susan E. Jackson, Consequences of Group Composition for the
Interpersonal Dynamics of Strategic Issue Processing, 8 ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT.
345, 355–59 (1992).
159. Dallas, supra note 2, at 1389–90 (explaining the upper echelon theory);
Hambrick & Mason, supra note 158, at 194–98 (same).
160. See Dallas, supra note 2, at 1391, 1396.
161. Id. at 1396.
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means that such groups tend to stake out extreme positions.162 By
contrast, a heterogeneous group is likely to contain a number of persons
with conflicting opinions, knowledge, and perspectives, which results in a
wider and more thorough consideration of alternatives and
consequences.163
Because groups of varied people will have different approaches to
analyzing and assessing information, they will produce a broader, even
more nuanced set of solutions.164 In this regard, both the quality of their
analysis and the quality of their ultimate decision are likely to be superior
to those of homogeneous groups. If we consider racially diverse boards
as more heterogeneous, then these studies suggest that such boards are
better able to fulfill their decision-making role because their diversity
enables them to consider more fully all relevant information when making
a decision. Their diversity also appears to ensure the high quality of their
ultimate solution because it will reflect a richer decision-making process.
Social science data also suggests that diversity can improve the
monitoring role of the board.
As part of their management
responsibilities, board members have an oversight function which entails
ongoing monitoring of the corporation and its operations.165 Enron and
other corporate debacles suggest that boards failed in this monitoring
function. Scholars have advanced many reasons for this failure, one of
which is that the Enron board lacked true independence,166 which led
them to rubber-stamp the decisions of managers, or to not critically
examine those decisions.167 In applying social science data on group
dynamics to Enron and other corporate governance failures, some have
asserted that Enron board members exhibited “groupthink,” which refers
to a kind of mindless adherence to group norms and a failure to challenge
decisions because of that adherence.168 The groupthink theory was
initially developed by Irving Janus in the 1970s, and has gained

162. Id. at 1401; O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1255–56; Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000).
163. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 5. Indeed, signers of an amicus brief in
Grutter also note the ability of diverse groups “to facilitate unique and creative approaches
to problem-solving arising from the integration of different perspectives.” See 65 Leading
American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 7.
164. See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups,
24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489 (1999).
165. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del
Ch. 1996) (noting that boards have an obligation to monitor the legal compliance efforts of
the corporation); Francis, 432 A.2d at 822 (noting that directors have a general monitoring
responsibility).
166. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1267.
167. See Ramirez, Sarbanes-Oxley Reform, supra note 2, at 840–41 (noting that
problems of “groupthink” contributed to problems at Enron and other companies).
168. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1238–39.
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popularity in the field of social psychology.169 According to the literature,
groupthink is a symptom unique to cohesive homogenous groups.170
Under this rationale, the Enron board’s homogeneity—it was almost all
white and all male171—led to a groupthink mentality that prevented it
from adequately assessing the actions of management.172 Racially diverse
boards avoid this problem by undermining the homogeneity that leads to
groupthink and its negative by-products.173
Certainly, the business community has embraced this rationale. As
an example, the business leaders who signed an amicus brief in Grutter
asserted that “the skills and training needed to succeed in business today
demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and
viewpoints,”174 and that such exposure is needed “at every level of an
organization.”175 These leaders emphasize that individuals of different
racial backgrounds may bring an awareness of different issues, and hence
provide a broader perspective to the boardroom and corporate
discussions.176 This perspective is in turn vital to corporations seeking to
serve a diverse and global customer and client base.177
However, the diversity mandated by the governance rationale may
undermine a board’s effectiveness by decreasing the level of trust and
comfort among directors. Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair
emphasize the importance of trust on corporate boards to ensuring that
boards operate effectively.178 Certainly, when boards include people with
different backgrounds, the level of trust within the board setting may
decline because of their unfamiliarity with one another.179 To the extent
that trust expedites the decision-making process,180 such a decline could
have a negative impact on that process. Lack of comfort may also have
169. Id. at 1238, 1257, 1259 (noting the popularity of the groupthink model, but
also that there are mixed results as to the validity of the groupthink model); see also
IRVING L. JANUS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982); IRVING L JANUS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 8–9 (1972) [hereinafter JANUS,
VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK].
170. See JANUS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK, supra note 169, at 197 (“The prime
condition repeatedly encountered in the case studies of fiascoes is group cohesiveness.”);
O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1261–62, 1306 (“One of the main lessons of the groupthink
theory is that social homogeneity on corporate boards harms critical deliberation.”).
171. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
172. See Ramirez, Sarbanes-Oxley Reform, supra note 2, at 839–41.
173. See id.
174. 65 Leading American Businesses Brief, supra note 8, at 5.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 7.
177. See id. at 3, 7.
178. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trust Worthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1796–99 (2001)
(discussing the importance of trust in corporate decision-making).
179. See infra notes 181–82.
180. Blair & Stout, supra note 178, at 1796.
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an impact on the ability of boards to work together—and diversity breeds
lack of comfort. Thus, while studies suggest that people feel more
comfortable and satisfied within groups of members who are like
themselves,181 others reveal that diverse groups not only experience more
communication problems, but also tend to report higher levels of anxiety
and frustration with their workgroup.182
At the very least, this suggests that corporations must manage
diversity at the board level to ensure that board members feel comfortable
with one another. The increased discomfort and lack of trust generated by
diversity also suggest that the governance rationale may overestimate the
ability of diverse groups to reach high quality decisions. Then too, people
of color may feel pressured to reduce this discomfort and lack of trust by
reducing their differences, making themselves more “racially palatable”
to their fellow board members.183 If this occurs, there will be greater
comfort, but less genuine diversity, undermining the ability of board
diversity to meet the objectives of the governance rationale.
The governance rationale may be flawed as well because it appears
to be based on a presumption that people of color will provide
heterogeneity or different perspectives simply by virtue of their race or
ethnicity. That presumption is vulnerable to an attack made by many
opponents of affirmative action that such a rationale presumes that race
can be used as a proxy for viewpoint and perspective. Professor Lani
Guinier argues that people of the same racial groups do have shared
experiences and perspectives.184 Others, such as Judge Richard A. Posner
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, note that race may
not be a tight proxy for viewpoint or experience.185 While this Article
does not seek to further that debate, it is worth noting that the observation
about the inappropriateness of using race as a proxy for viewpoint or
experience may be particularly salient in the context of corporate boards.
Indeed, when measuring the heterogeneity of a group, group theory looks
at a variety of factors including race, gender, educational background, and
financial status.186

181. Dallas, supra note 2, at 1393; Jackson, supra note 158, at 361–62.
182. See Karen A. Jehn, Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and
Productivity: A New Form of Organizing in the Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. Pa.
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 473, 477–79 (1998) (discussing the tension and hostility caused by
diversity in groups)
183. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 149, at 1657–58.
184. See Lani Guinier, The Pigment Perplex: The Complexity of Race Reveals the
Inefficacy of Conventional Admissions Criteria and Demonstrates the Vital Importance of
Diversity, AM. LAW, Aug. 2002, at 61.
185. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 690 (6th ed. 2003);
Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of “Affirmative Action”, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 171, 181 (1979).
186. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 158, at 197–98.
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Typically, the only significant difference between directors of color
and white directors is their race or ethnicity. Indeed, only 3% of board
members are women of color, so most of the people of color on boards
are men.187 Viewing directors of color in light of the factors used to
determine heterogeneity suggests that their presence may not be sufficient
to create a heterogeneous board. From this perspective, we need to be
careful when trying to use race as a proxy for the type of heterogeneity
needed to combat groupthink and to promote more effective monitoring
and decision-making.
With regard to this issue, there is both good and bad news. The good
news is that some studies suggest that even among people with shared
social and economic backgrounds, people of color are more likely to
identify along racial lines when the issues they confront relate to race.188
The bad news is that these studies do not indicate how such people will
behave with regard to issues that do not involve race or some racial
subtext. Social science theory suggests that they may not identify along
racial lines. Indeed, group theory reveals that when people come
together, they look for commonality or shared characteristics, and make
decisions based on their common ground rather than their differences.189
The more common ground there is, the more likely their similarities, and
not their differences, will dictate their behavior.190
With so much common ground to choose from, one wonders how
different perspectives among directors of color will arise. The possibility
for differing perspectives to arise is further diminished by the manner in
which directors are selected. Indeed, directors nominate other directors,
and in this nomination process, they tend to nominate people who are like
themselves,191 or people who they believe will most likely “fit in.”192
187. See CATALYST, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that there has recently been a
slight increase from 2.5% to 3%).
188. Studies regarding African Americans and public opinion reveal that there is
a strong racial divide on matters related to race and matters with a racial subtext—“matters
of public policy that individuals perceive to disproportionately affect one race more than
others, such as the death penalty, welfare programs, and food stamps.” Guy-Uriel E.
Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of
Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1236–37 (2003); see also MICHAEL C. DAWSON,
BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 55, 182 (1994);
PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., HOPE AND INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS’ RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND
PARTY POLITICS 75–81 (1989); DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY
COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 27–33 (1996). Racial identity is a
strong predictor of how different racial groups view these matters. See DAWSON, supra, at
115–17; GURIN ET AL., supra, at 109. This result remains basically static even when one
controls for other factors such as class or status. DAWSON, supra, at 117; GURIN ET AL.,
supra, at 109.
189. See Dallas, supra note 2, at 1396.
190. See id. (noting that the more diverse a group’s preferences, the less reliance
is placed on similarities when the group makes decisions).
191. Recently, the SEC proposed changes that would allow shareholders, under
certain circumstances, to include their nominees for directors in the company’s proxy
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This means nominating people of color who are not viewed as divisive.193
Thus, there is a strong possibility that the people of color selected as
board members will be selected for their similarities to other board
members, undermining the effectiveness of the governance rationale by
decreasing the possibility that the perspectives of people of color will be
different from that of other directors.
Indeed, Carbado and Gulati explain this problem in the context of
corporate promotions more generally.194 In their recent work, they
conclude that the type of people of color most likely to be promoted
within corporations are not likely to promote the interests of other people
of color.195 This is because corporate officials often only seek to promote
those people of color who are racially palatable and demonstrate a
willingness to subordinate their group identity for the good of the firm.196
These characteristics are particularly important for managers of color
because they must be perceived to have the capacity to manage whites
without making them uncomfortable.197 In this way, the corporation’s
promotion system screens out those people of color who exhibit racial
differences.198 The same can be expected from the director nomination
process. Moreover, given that directors are drawn from the same pool of
corporate managers who already have been prescreened through the
corporation promotion process, the director nomination process may act
statement. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director
Nominations, Release Nos. 34-48626, IC-26206 (Oct. 14, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 240, 249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
For a discussion of the proposed rules, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003); and Lewis J. Sundquist III,
Comment: Proposal To Allow Shareholder Nomination of Corporate Directors:
Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1471 (2004).
However, it appears that these proposed changes will not take effect.
In November of 2003, the SEC did adopt a rule requiring corporations to disclose
how shareholders may propose candidates to a company’s nominating committee, as well
as additional disclosure regarding the nominating committees procedure. See U.S.
Securities & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule: Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee
Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8340, 34-48825, IC-26262 (Nov. 24, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–229, 240, 249, 270, 274) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8340.htm; see also Stewart M. Landefeld & Danielle
Benderly, New SEC Rules Require Expanded Nominating Committee Disclosure in Proxy
Statements, 18 INSIGHTS 2 (2004); Sundquist, supra, at 1477–78. The rules took effect
January 1, 2004. See SEC Final Rule, supra.
192. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1804 (noting a bias within the
selection mechanism).
193. See id. at 1790 (noting a commitment to sameness and a rejection of
difference).
194. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 149, at 1654–59.
195. See id. at 1672–73.
196. See id. at 1657–58, 1675–76.
197. See id. at 1672–77.
198. See id. at 1654–59.
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as a second screen, ensuring that directors of color may be the least likely
people to advance and promote the interests of nonwhites.
Even assuming that board members of color have perspectives
different from other board members, the governance rationale may
deemphasize the importance of critical mass to ensure that people of color
will feel comfortable voicing their perspective. Most boards do not have
a critical mass of people of color. While 76% of corporations have at
least one person of color,199 very few boards have more than one. In
1997, when just over half of Fortune 1000 firms had at least one person
of color, only 11.5% had two, while only three firms had four or more
directors that were people of color—and this is for boards that have an
average size of eleven directors.200 This study reveals that there is no
critical mass of directors of color. The literature on critical mass suggests
that people of color may feel marginalized and thus fail to speak out
unless they have others in the group who share their views and
perspectives.201 The Grutter court adopted the conclusions of this
literature, noting the importance of critical mass in the classroom setting
to ensure that people of color feel comfortable voicing their diverse
viewpoints.202 According to the Court, critical mass promotes cross-racial
understanding and diminishes stereotyping by allowing diverse
individuals to espouse different views.203 Without this critical mass,
directors may internalize the need to build cohesion, or feel
uncomfortable voicing views or positions different from the majority.
Thus, corporations that do not seek to build a critical mass may not be
able to take advantage of the governance rationale.
F.

Concluding Assessments

As this Part reveals, there are both merits and limitations to the
business rationales. With regard to the talent rationale, there is certainly
merit in the assertion that corporations need to take advantage of the
talents of all people within our country or they may miss out on new
innovations and, given the demographics, they may find difficulties
meeting their future employment needs. However, corporations’ narrow
view of board qualifications and candidates may undermine the ability of
199. See supra note 16.
200. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 9–12, 27 tbl.3.
201. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professional Responsibility of
Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 14–15
(2002); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Teaching Without a Critical Mass:
Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Diversity Rationale, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316,
317–18 (2004); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19 (noting that critical mass prevents
isolation and allows students to feel comfortable expressing their views).
202. 539 U.S. at 333, 335 (endorsing the law school goal of ensuring critical mass
in its student population).
203. See id. at 330.
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the talent rationale to encourage diversity except in a limited manner. As
the market rationale suggests, people of color may do a better job of
ensuring that corporations appreciate and respond to the concerns of
others within their community, particularly when those concerns relate to
matters of race or ethnicity. However, in light of the fact that
corporations can use both managers and marketing firms to reach this
goal, it is not clear that such corporations also need to use directors who
may not have any additional expertise. Then too, there is some legitimacy
to the assertion within both the governance and employee relations’
rationales that directors of color may bring different perspectives and
ideas to the board, which may facilitate the adoption of policies aimed at
enhancing worker satisfaction and decreasing conflict and costly
discrimination suits.
However, these rationales deemphasize the importance of critical
mass and a more comprehensive strategy for managing diversity,
suggesting that directors of color can handle that task on their own. They
also deemphasize the possibility that people of color will be selected for
their sameness, rather than their ability to bring different perspectives to
the board. In the end, these business rationales appear to promise more
than directors of color can realistically deliver, and this false promise
stems, in part, from the failure to appreciate the more limited role
directors (as opposed to managers) have in creating and implementing
corporate practices as well as an overblown expectation regarding the
ability of directors of color to manage the conflicts and issues presented
by a diverse workforce.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BUSINESS RATIONALES AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR BOARD DIVERSITY
Given that there are merits to at least some aspects of the business
rationales, the fact that they may be flawed as well may not be a sufficient
reason to reject them if such rationales have the ability to compel
corporations to increase diversity. Instead, the more relevant inquiry may
be one that seeks to assess the relative costs and benefits of relying on
business rationales to advance diversity on corporate boards. This Part
asserts that while there may be practical benefits to relying on such
rationales, there are also both individual and societal costs associated with
that reliance.
A.
1.

The Benefits

PROFIT AND PRACTICALITY

Undoubtedly, there are important practical reasons for choosing to
rely on business rationales to promote diversity. Historically, calls for
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increased diversity have rested on social or moral grounds. The growth of
the business rationales for diversity stems from a concern that moral or
social appeals have proven insufficient to encourage corporate America to
increase diversity within its ranks.204 In fact, in some ways, rationales for
diversity have undergone an evolution.205 The first stage of rationales was
grounded in concepts of discrimination. Thus, proponents argued that
corporations needed to actively increase diversity in order to redress prior
discrimination against people of color by society in general and corporate
America in particular.206
Proponents also argued that the lack of diversity within the upper
ranks of corporate America reflected a glass ceiling, which resulted either
from blatant racism or discrimination, or from unconscious racism or
stereotyping.207 Corporate America had a moral obligation to penetrate
the glass ceiling by actively pursuing diversity. Thus, even if we accept
that corporate executives are not racist, at best, the fact that boards
continue to be primarily all white and all male suggests that corporations
and their nominating committees have failed to properly appreciate the
talent of persons of other races and ethnicities. At worst, corporations’
refusal to move beyond the “good old boy” network when searching for
directors may reflect a more deep-seated problem, an unconscious
stereotyping about the ability of nonwhites to serve as directors.
Proponents of diversity insisted that corporations have a moral obligation
to reject these presumptions by actively seeking out diversity.
The second stage of rationales adopted a more positive approach,
rooted in concepts about our ideal society. Proponents argued that we
should celebrate our diversity.208 More specifically, proponents claimed
204. See Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1548–55.
205. This Article does not mean to assert that there has not been overlap in the
evolution or stages of rationales for diversity. Hence today, proponents continue to assert
both moral and economic justifications for increased diversity. However, the stages do
reflect an evolution whereby particular rationales have been relatively dominant.
206. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305–06 (1978);
Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 858–
59 (1995); Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated To Strive for
Diversity: Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1165, 1166 (1997); Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative
Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677
(2004).
207. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547,
554–57 (1990); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498; U.S. Glass Ceiling Comm., Good for
Business: Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital: Fact-Finding Report of the
Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 52 (BNA), at S-2 to S-4 (Supp.
Mar. 16, 1995); M. Neil Browne & Andra Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The
Glass Ceiling, the Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 61, 67–75 (2003) (discussing the causes and effects of the glass
ceiling).
208. See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577–78 (2000)
(discussing how “‘[c]elebrating the value of . . . diversity has become routine’”) (quoting
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that as the population and the workforce becomes more diverse,
corporations have a moral or social obligation to ensure that their
executive and board ranks also include diverse individuals.209
While the arguments developed within the first and second stages
had strong symbolic and even rhetorical appeal, they apparently failed to
energize the business community. Thus, while surveys suggest that
directors and corporate executives believe board diversity to be an
important goal,210 they also indicate their belief that rationales must go
beyond moral or social appeals. Indeed, participants at a forum sponsored
by the Conference Board, including representatives from such
corporations as Bank of America, PepsiCo, and TIAA-CREF,
“immediately rejected the notion that board diversity for its own sake,
without a business case, was sufficient reason to act.”211 Thus, the very
fact that scholars and business leaders alike feel compelled to advance
business justifications for board diversity indicates that moral rationales
may not be enough to encourage voluntary measures for increasing
diversity. For these reasons, a third stage of diversity rationales has
evolved that relies upon business or market considerations. This stage
represents a clear response to the business community’s rejection of moral
or social appeals for diversity.212 From this perspective, even if flawed,
many perceive business rationales as the only method available to
convince corporations to enhance diversity.
2.

BUSINESS RATIONALES AND BOARD FIDUCIARY DUTY

One may even assert that economic rationales are more consistent
with a board’s fiduciary responsibilities. When carrying out their
responsibilities, board members have a fiduciary duty to take actions that
are in the best interests of the corporation,213 and their failure to do so

PROMISE AND DILEMMA: PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL DIVERSITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 3
(Eugene Y. Lowe, Jr. ed., 1999)) (alteration in original); Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived
Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1933, 1937 (2001)
(discussing how the celebration of diversity enjoys great acceptance and is endorsed as a
policy goal).
209. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1565–67 (noting the growing moral
consensus that diversity is the “‘right ting to do’”) (quoting HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL.,
RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 75–76 tbl.3.1 (1985)).
210. See KORN/FERRY INT’L & CORP. BD. MAGAZINE STUDY, WHAT DIRECTORS
THINK 2 (2002) (indicating that 58.9% of board members would like increased minority
representation on their board).
211. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD.,
BOARD DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE
OF CORPORATE BOARDS 7 (Research Report No. 1230-99-RR, (1999)).
212. See Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1556 (“Corporate America has fully signed on
to the business case for diversity . . . .”).
213. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, supra note 87, § 8.30(a).
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represents a breach of that duty.214 Many interpret this duty as an
obligation to maximize shareholder profit. On one hand, economic
rationales appear consistent with that kind of obligation because they
suggest that increasing diversity on the board will result in enhanced
profitability and corporate effectiveness. On the other hand, requiring
boards to adopt measures aimed at increasing diversity without any
economic or business rationale for those measures may reflect a breach of
that duty.215 From this perspective, such a rationale may be necessary to
comport with directors’ fiduciary commitments.
3.

ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Business rationales also have some benefit for individual directors
and even communities of color more generally. Indeed, such rationales
appear to recognize both the value and the economic viability of people of
color. For example, the governance rationale suggests that people of
color add value to an organization. Then too, the market rationale stresses
the economic power of people of color and hence may be empowering for
the individual directors appointed to court and represent those
communities, and for the communities being courted, finally providing
them with not only a voice, but also leverage within corporate America.
As one scholar notes, “power in the market is power, and that is
liberating.”216
Given the legacy of disenfranchisement and
disempowerment experienced by people of color, this benefit should not
be undervalued.
B.
1.

The Costs217

THE COSTS OF BEING SET UP FOR FAILURE

If a director of color’s existence on a board is measured in terms of
her ability to deliver on the claims underlying the business rationales, then
214. See id. § 8.31.
215. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(finding that a decision to withhold dividends from shareholders, which was based on
social concerns and a desire to benefit the general public, violated directors’ fiduciary duty
to generate profit for shareholders).
216. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
341, 350 (1991) (discussing feminist arguments in support of surrogacy based on marketbased liberation).
217. One cost which should not be overlooked, but does not stem specifically
from business rationales, is the cost of encouraging directors of color to increase their
board membership during a time of corporate uncertainty and enhanced risks of liability.
Indeed, post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley studies suggest that most people are leery of
becoming directors. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Moreover, for apparently
the first time ever, outside directors have agreed to pay out of their own pockets in order to
settle a federal securities law action. See supra note 36.
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such rationales create standards that such directors may inevitably fail to
meet. Part II reveals some of the individual difficulties with directors of
color’s ability to fulfill the claims posited by business rationales. For
example, the market rationale appears to rely on board members’ ability
to interact more actively with clients and customers than many board
members traditionally do.218 It also appears to assume that directors of
color can relate to customers and clients of color, an assumption that may
be inaccurate given the class differences between such directors and the
corporation’s client and customer base.219 Moreover, even if some
directors could fulfill some of the claims of the business rationale, it
seems virtually impossible for directors to achieve all of them. Thus, the
rationales in aggregation may make their failure a virtual certainty.
There is both an individual and a societal cost associated with these
potential failures. With regard to the individual, she may experience
frustration and anxiety in seeking to meet what may be unattainable
objectives. Then too, her position as a director may be jeopardized if she
cannot fulfill these objectives, causing damage to her personal and
professional reputation. In addition to these individual costs, the failure
to meet these objectives may undermine the firm’s ability to retain
directors of color in the future. On one hand, those led to expect that
people of color could achieve many, if not all, of these claims may be
disappointed in the outcome. This disappointment may translate into a
reluctance to actively pursue people of color in the future. On the other
hand, for those already reluctant to value the importance of diversity, such
failure can serve as validation of their assumptions regarding people of
color. That failure certainly provides them with ample reason to reject
diversity as a whole. In this way, business rationales may be costly
because they foster unrealistic expectations that not only negatively
impact an individual’s position, but may also undermine future efforts to
achieve diversity.
2.

THE COSTS OF OVEREXTENSION

Business rationales may also cause directors of color to become
overextended. As the empirical data suggests, directors of color already
tend to be overextended because they tend to sit on too many boards.220
The business rationales may contribute to this overextension. As some
note, “[c]orporate America’s push to achieve diversity in the boardroom
has resulted in the same names called over and over again.”221 The
218. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 153.
220. See supra notes 28–30.
221. Lisa DiCarlo, America’s Most Overworked Company Directors,
(Aug.
8,
2002),
at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/08/08/
FORBES.COM
0808overworkedpackage_print.html.
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pressure to increase board diversity, coupled with a corporation’s
perception of the pool problem, may explain why people of color tend to
serve on multiple boards at a higher rate than their white counterparts. In
this regard, business rationales that fail to properly address the pool
problem exacerbate the relative overextension of directors of color. The
fact that directors hold multiple directorships only reveals part of their
overextension. This is because even if directors of color serve on only a
few boards, they may feel obligated to attempt to meet the objectives of
the various business rationales. Such an obligation may lead these board
members to take on many more tasks than their white counterparts. In
this regard, the business rationales augment the commitment directors of
color must undertake.
Such an augmentation comes at a price to the individual and society.
The current consensus regarding good corporate governance practices is
that this kind of overcommitment is detrimental to directors’ ability to
perform their functions with proper vigor.222 Indeed, one study notes that
based on the number of companies in which they serve as directors,
directors who serve on six or more boards probably had more than 200
hours of board and committee meetings per person in 2001.223 This is in
addition to their full-time jobs, which often include serving as chief
executive of a large company.224 As the study concludes, these directors
“are simply stretched too thin.”225 The result of being stretched too thin
may be that directors fail to pay appropriate attention to their
responsibilities, undermining their effectiveness and perhaps leading to
costly mistakes. Then too, if directors of color are perceived as
performing their duties in a less than rigorous manner, that perception
could damage diversity efforts by generating or confirming negative
perceptions regarding people of color’s performance abilities. From this
perspective, these rationales are costly because they encourage
overextension, placing directors of color in a position that may
compromise their ability to perform effectively.
This overextension also has negative repercussions for the boards on
which these directors serve. Boards which continue to have directors of
color who hold multiple directorships have received bad corporate
governance marks for that fact alone. Indeed, two corporations were
given “F” grades from a shareholder activist group as a result of having
directors on their board serve on multiple boards.226 Those directors were
222. See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 24 (noting that many
corporations now limit the number of outside boards on which their CEOs can serve).
223. See DiCarlo, supra note 221.
224. See id. (noting that, of the five directors sitting on six or more boards of S&P
companies, Jackson is the president of Rensselear Polytechnic Institute, Gray is the chief
executive of the United Negro College Fund, and Jordan is the senior managing partner of
the investment bank Lazard Freres).
225. Id.
226. See Citrano, supra note 82.
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black.227 Because such a practice may undermine a director’s ability to
perform her duties, it may also jeopardize the overall effectiveness of the
corporation.
3.

THE COSTS OF MARGINALIZATION

Many of the business rationales may cause corporations to
marginalize directors or communities of color in ways that may have
negative repercussions. First, corporations may marginalize the role such
directors undertake. For example, the market rationale may encourage
marginalization by suggesting that directors’ roles should be limited to
interacting with their particular community. For example, that rationale
suggests that corporations should utilize black directors to help manage or
develop black clients and customers. Along these same lines, by
suggesting that directors of color have the unique ability to appreciate the
concerns of their particular communities or employees of their own racial
group, the employee relations and market rationales may encourage
corporations to place such directors on only those committees aimed at
addressing such groups. As an example, both Texaco and Coca-Cola
have established “public responsibility” committees aimed at responding
to diversity and social issues, and their black board members were either
on that committee or the chair of the committee.228 In fact, that
committee is the only one on which the black director at Coca-Cola
serves.229
This pigeon-holing of directors of color is problematic. Business
rationales that encourage such pigeon-holing create limits on directors’
ability to be full participants on the board. In that regard, such rationales
may not lead to empowering either the director or the community she is
supposed to represent. In fact, business rationales that encourage
marginalization may conflict with others that not only insist that people of
color should be used for their full range of talents, but also insist that
people of color’s differing perspective is critical to all decisions made by
the corporation.
In addition, these rationales may cause corporations to marginalize
directors as individuals. Indeed, the governance rationale appears to force
directors into the role of an outsider. The notion that directors of color
should or must bring differing viewpoints into the boardroom means that
227. See id.; DiCarlo, supra note 221.
228. See COCA-COLA PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 130, at 17 (noting that
McHenry chairs the “Public Issues and Diversity Review Committee”). The committee
“aids the Board in discharging its responsibilities relating to public issues and diversity.”
See id. at 21; see also TEXACO PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 127, at 5 (noting that Jenifer
sits on the “Public Responsibility Committee”).
229. See COCA-COLA PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 130, at 17. Jenifer also
serves on Texaco’s audit committee. See TEXACO PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 127, at
5.
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they may become the “devil’s advocate” for the board. While this may be
productive for the board as a whole,230 it makes it difficult for the
individual directors forced to assume that role to establish cohesion with
other board members who may view them as antagonistic. This kind of
marginalization could ultimately lead to decreased communication and
understanding among directors, exacerbating as opposed to alleviating
tension between various racial groups. Enabling corporations to use
directors of color in this way also shifts the burden away from others in
the corporation to educate themselves regarding the concerns and issues
of communities different from their own.
Finally, business rationales may encourage corporations to
marginalize communities of color in a manner that may prove destructive.
The market rationale encourages corporations to target their advertising
and products in a manner that appeals to specified communities.231 At
first blush, this appears to be a positive development, ensuring that
corporations meet the particularized needs of those communities.
However, there may be negative repercussions. Given the negative
perceptions and stereotypes that continue to be attributed to various
groups, if corporations create or target specific products or services for
such groups, there exists the potential that such products or services may
be inferior, or at least construed as inferior. The FCC’s study confirms
that such potential can, in fact, be realized. That study illustrates the
widespread belief of many corporate officials and advertisers that once a
product or service becomes associated with particular racial groups, it will
be viewed as less valuable.232
Consequently, officials and advertisers pay less for advertising those
“ethnic” products or services,233 even when qualitative data reveals that
communities of color spend as much or more on such products or
services.234 Then too, the study reveals that companies do not want to be
perceived as making ethnically targeted products for fear of driving away

230. See O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1304–06 (suggesting the positive impact a
permanent “devil’s advocate” could have on boards).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See OFORI, supra note 115, at 35–36 (noting luxury car manufacturers
concerns that being identified with ethnic customers would stigmatize or “diminish the
value” of their cars, and noting that J.C. Penney’s abandoned a successful product
campaign out of fear that white America would think it had become a black store).
233. See id. at 13 (noting the belief that the black consumer is less valued, and
hence companies pay less to market products for black consumers); id. at 32–35 (noting
the widespread existence of “minority” discounts, whereby companies offer discounted
rates for advertising products on stations aimed at people of color). Minority broadcasters
indicated that these discounts reduced their revenues by 63%, while the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that they represented a significant barrier
to competition. Id. at 13, 28.
234. See id. at 41–42.
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their white customers.235 Hence, when corporations do engage in such
targeting, they target categories that are less upscale and of a lesser
quality.236 An example, albeit problematic, is liquor, where even when
advertisers spend significant dollars targeting the black community, they
rarely target them with expensive brands.237 These rationales may
contribute to these practices. By encouraging corporations to develop
different strategies and products for distinct communities, some business
rationales may have the opposite effect than intended, encouraging, or at
least facilitating, the development of second-class products or services.
4.

THE COSTS OF COMMODIFICATION

Grounding the need for diversity within market-based rationales
appears to embrace racial commodification. Such commodification refers
to the notion that race or racial identity can or should be used as a
commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace.238 At their crux,
arguments for diversity based on business rationales reflect
commodification because those arguments promote diversity for the value
such diversity can bring to a corporation. Most notably, the market
rationale rests on the notion that communities of color represent buying
power and that corporations can utilize directors of color to attract that
power. Other rationales are less obvious, but nonetheless embrace
commodification because they justify diversity based on its economic
value to the corporation. For example, the litigation rationale suggests
that corporations can utilize directors of color to decrease their incidence
of racial tension and the corresponding costs associated with the lawsuits
that arise from that tension.239 In this regard, such arguments embrace
notions of racial commodification.
First, such commodification is objectionable on moral grounds.
Recently, several scholars have discussed the impact of commodification,
particularly as it relates to women. Most notably, Professor Margaret
Jane Radin objects to universal commodification, which is the idea that all
things and people can be commodified or viewed in terms of their market
value.240 Relying in part on Immanuel Kant, she argues that such
235. See id. at 35 (noting that companies do not advertise tourism upscale
locations to blacks for fear that it will “turn off” the white traveler).
236. See id. at 33 (noting that companies do not target blacks for upscale or
luxury products because they are not seen as suitable customers).
237. See id. at 35.
238. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1–2 (1996)
(describing the concept of commodification and noting that personal attributes can be
commodities).
239. See supra Part II.C.
240. RADIN, supra note 238, at 56; Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859–63 (1987). For a critique of Professor Margaret Jane
Radin’s work, see John A. Robertson, Human Flourishing and Limits on Markets, 95
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commodification can be rejected on purely moral grounds.241 Under
Kant’s perception of personhood, persons have value in and of
themselves.242 They also have attributes that can be valued, controlled, or
manipulated.243 Kant argues that the moral distinction between people
and objects is that people must be treated as ends in themselves, not
means—and not for their particular attributes.244 Hence, Kant’s moral law
would reject commodification to the extent it requires that people be
treated as means and not ends in themselves, failing to value people for
their intrinsic worth.245 As an extension, Kant’s moral law would reject
arguments for diversity resting on business rationales because they rely on
the economic value people of color can bring to corporations, treating
them as a means to enhance profit and not as valuable ends in themselves.
Second, because commodification encourages society to view people
of color as commodities and not as valuable persons,246 it may encourage
society to view such people as less valuable than their white counterparts.
Commodification encourages corporate constituents to value directors of
color in terms of their ability to reach particular economic objectives, and
when they fail to reach those objectives, they may be seen as less
valuable. In fact, Radin argues that commodification can also lead to selfdevaluation because individuals come to internalize market rhetoric and
see themselves as mere commodities as opposed to intrinsically valuable
beings.247 Of course, in a certain sense, everyone who encounters the
corporate enterprise is being commodified in order to benefit the
corporation and its shareholders. This includes directors whose role—
particularly post-Enron and post-Sarbanes-Oxley—will be judged against
their ability to meet the corporations’ financial objectives.248 In this
respect, rationales that embody commodification appear to treat directors
of color in the same manner as other directors.

MICH. L. REV. 2139, 2148–50 (1997) (reviewing RADIN, supra note 238); and Stephen J.
Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and
Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 404–05 (1993). See also Martha M. Ertman, What’s
Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82
N.C. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2003) (discussing Radin’s and Judge Richard Posner’s theories with
respect to commodification). For a discussion of commodification in the context of mass
restitution and slavery, see Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for
Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1423, 1426 (2004).
241. See Radin, supra note 240, at 1881.
242. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(1785), reprinted in THE MORAL LAW 53, 95–96 (H.J. Paton trans., 1967) (1948).
243. Radin, supra note 216, at 345 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 52–53, 64–65 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)).
244. See id. at 345 & n.4 (citing KANT, supra note 242).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 345–46.
247. See id.
248. See supra note 36 (discussing recent shareholder suits against directors).
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Indeed, even Radin notes that not all commodification is
objectionable.249
Instead, she argues for partial commodification,
pointing out that some attributes may be treated as commodities without
destroying personhood.250 A categorical rejection of commodification
fails to appreciate that it may be empowering for individuals of color
because it assigns them some positive value within the marketplace. In
this regard, commodification may treat directors of color like all other
directors, enhancing their personhood.
However, as Radin notes, commodification can have a different and
more damaging impact when applied to particular groups.251 First, while
it is true that all directors may be viewed as commodities in the sense that
they are judged by their ability to meet corporate objectives, unlike other
directors, directors of color will also be evaluated on their ability to meet
the objectives advanced by the various business rationales. As this
Article reveals, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for directors to meet
those objectives. When that occurs, we may expect their value to
deteriorate in a manner distinct from their white counterparts. Second,
the historical and social understanding of race and racial groups makes
commodification of such groups more troubling than commodification of
whites.
On one hand, a complete rejection of commodification fails to
recognize that people can distinguish between personhood and attributes
that comprise personhood. On the other hand, the ability to make
distinctions between personhood and the economic value of their
attributes may apply with less force in the context of people of color.
Indeed, Radin notes that market discourse does not exist in a vacuum;
rather, it exists within a culture that not only includes a history of racial
and sexual subordination, but also includes lingering racism and
patriarchy.252 Historically, people of color have been viewed as
commodities.253 The obvious example is slavery, when society did not
distinguish between black people and their attributes, but instead

249. See RADIN, supra note 238, at 102–03, 134–36; Radin, supra note 240, at
1921–25.
250. See RADIN, supra note 238, at 102–03, 134–36; Radin, supra note 240, at
1921–25.
251. Radin, supra note 216, at 347–49 (noting that commodification is especially
problematic for people of color because they have historically been devalued and viewed
only in terms of their economic value).
252. See id.
253. For some examples of interesting discussions of slavery and commodity, see
Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002); Douglas L. Colbert,
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995); Adrienne D.
Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV.
221 (1999); and Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309 (1996).
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dismissed their value as humans and treated them as commodities to be
purchased and sold.254
It is this historical context that continues to taint our perceptions of
race today. Because of this history, commodification, as applied to
women and people of color, is more likely to lead to suppression and
devaluation.255 Consistent with Radin’s assessment, this social and
historical context suggests why it may be more problematic to view
directors of color as commodities as opposed to other directors whose
market value will not be assessed against this historical backdrop. In this
way, economic-based justifications for diversity appear problematic
because they encourage corporations to view people of color in terms of
their market value, which could lead to a devaluation of such people.
5.

COSTS OF CEDING MORAL AUTHORITY

There is also a cost involved in ceding the legitimacy of moral and
social rationales for diversity. This is because business rationales shift the
discussion about diversity away from moral and social issues and toward
economic-based and market-based justifications. That shift may represent
a subtle acknowledgement of the invalidity of the former issues. To be
fair, it is possible that diversity advocates can seek to advance both moral
and economic rationales for diversity simultaneously, negating this shift
and its connotations. However, given that business rationales were
adopted in response to the apparent ineffectiveness of moral claims,256
this possibility does not appear to be a realistic one. From this
perspective, these business rationales do not appear to be designed to
supplement moral ones, but rather to replace them. Diversity advocates
must ask themselves if that replacement, and the implicit
acknowledgement that it may represent is appropriate, particularly in light
of the empirical data which lends credence to these moral or social
rationales and suggests that the glass ceiling for people of color is not
being overcome.
Then too, by placing rationales for diversity squarely in market
terms, diversity advocates may allow corporations to ignore confronting
the legacy of discrimination and its lingering effects. Such allowance
comes at a price. It is possible that corporations and society cannot
effectively manage diversity without acknowledging the moral and social
254. See Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery
and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002); Douglas L.
Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995);
Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); and Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender,
and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309 (1996).
255. See Radin, supra note 216, at 347–49.
256. See supra notes 211–12.
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issues that underlie conflicts associated with diversity. Also, in the face
of subtle and not so subtle attacks on affirmative action, ceding the moral
space, rather than confronting those who would challenge the moral and
social legitimacy of diversity claims, may allow others to claim that
space. This is particularly dangerous if it turns out that these business
rationales are also illegitimate because then diversity advocates may be
left with no justification for their efforts. In this respect, such advocates
should use their energies to develop new modes of thinking about the
moral and social imperatives for diversity, as opposed to developing
strategies that shift the focus away from such imperatives.
When thinking about that shift, diversity advocates might actually
find support in recent corporate scholarship that supports a broader
understanding of a corporation’s obligations. Indeed, historically there
have always been two modes of thought with respect to the corporation
and its obligations.257 Certainly, there are many corporate scholars who
contend that the corporation’s primary, if not only, concern should be the
maximization of profit.258 These scholars support the “shareholder
primacy” model of the corporation.259 Business rationales seem perfectly
suited to this shareholder primacy conception of the corporation.
However, there are other scholars who take a broader view of the
corporation, insisting that corporate actors should maximize the interests
of all of the relevant actors who interact with the corporate enterprise.260
Based on this conception of the corporation, advancing initiatives that
take into account social concerns and the interests of employees and other
constituents may be well within the framework of corporations’
obligations.
Consistent with this conception, scholars have historically insisted
that corporations have a social responsibility to adopt measures beyond
those specifically tied to financial benefits.261 In fact, recently, business
leaders at the forefront of corporate governance reform have advocated
these principles. In commenting on directors’ role, Ira Millstein, who
drafted one of the first OECD Principles of Corporate Governance,
recently stated that directors must be “people whom shareholders,

257. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) (noting that society has alternated
between two views of the corporation, one contending that corporate actors should
maximize shareholder wealth, and another contending that corporate actors should make
decisions that account for the interests of all corporate constituents).
258. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367–69 (1932).
259. See Allen, supra note 257, at 265.
260. See supra note 257.
261. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932).
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employees, suppliers, customers and communities trust to ‘do the right
thing.’”262
Most significantly, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, who only a few years ago claimed that all of society had
accepted the shareholder primacy model,263 note that today’s corporate
form “enhances the probability that [board members] will respond in a
principled fashion to the interests of all corporate constituencies simply
through moral principles and social pressure.”264 This broader notion of
the corporation means that corporate actors do not have to justify their
actions in terms of market returns, but can pursue actions that have a
valuable impact on the corporation and the community it serves.
Along these lines, courts have sanctioned corporate actions that
appear to stem from this broader understanding of corporate
responsibilities. Hence, even when they do not advance short-term
profits, courts will not overturn director actions so long as they can be tied
to the long-term health of the corporation.265 For example, courts have
upheld charitable giving by boards based on the notion that such giving
enhances the community image of the corporation, which benefits the
corporation, if only intangibly.266 Like charitable giving, promoting board
diversity for its own sake may serve to enhance the public image of a
corporation. Also, courts have allowed corporations to forgo profits in
order to preserve the integrity of the community in which it serves.267
Similarly, courts have enabled corporations to prevent shareholders from
taking advantage of the lucrative returns available in connection with a
takeover, so that corporations can protect their employees and society.268
262. See Ira M. Millstein, A Perspective on Corporate Governance (Rules,
Principles, or Both), in THE ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATION (forthcoming Sept. 2005)
(manuscript at 7, on file with author).
263. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[T]here is convergence on a consensus
that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make
corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct
terms, only to those interests.”).
264. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 12 (2004).
265. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(allowing directors to forego profits to advance the long-term concerns of the corporation).
266. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del.
Ch. 1969) (noting that the overall benefits of charitable giving outweighed the loss of
income to shareholders).
267. See, e.g., Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780 (allowing corporations to forego profit
to prevent the neighborhood’s deterioration).
268. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349, 1357 (Del.
1985) (allowing directors to adopt antitakeover strategies in order to protect employees);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that when
defending against a takeover, corporations could consider the interests of customers,
employees, and even the community).
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Courts sanction these actions based on a corporate governance paradigm
that contends that corporations have an obligation beyond maximizing
shareholder profits and returns.269
Certainly, diversity efforts justified on moral or social grounds
would fit into this paradigm. Thus, rather than fitting their arguments into
the shareholder primacy framework, diversity advocates should seek to
push this broader concept of the corporation. This effort not only appears
more consistent with the modern understanding of corporations’ role
within society, but also encourages people to view the corporation in
terms other than its market viability. Such a view makes it easier to
justify efforts on social appeals, a justification for diversity that may be
more honest and valid than business ones.
This Part reveals that there are benefits, but also important
drawbacks, to business rationales for diversity. The practical benefits of
these rationales cannot be overlooked, not only because many believe that
they are the only way in which advocates can advance diversity initiatives
in the current climate, but also because they—perhaps for the first time—
recognize the power and value of people of color. Yet, the drawbacks
caution against adopting these rationales without reservation. Indeed, in
the long term, such gains may be problematic because they are based on
concepts that encourage the devaluation of people of color, the by-product
of which is negative treatment. In other words, in order to be viewed as
full participants in the corporate structure, people of color cannot begin
from a premise that they only have limited worth.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the diversity of the nations’ population and workforce,
corporate boards are not as diverse as one would expect. Indeed, nearly
25% of Fortune 1000 companies do not have any people of color on their
board.270 Then too, more than 90% of the available board seats within
those companies are held by whites.271 Reforms do not appear to have
altered this environment.
The issue, therefore, is what strategy can be employed to enhance
board diversity. The problem with relying on economic-centered or
business-centered rationales to encourage such diversity is that while they
clearly have some merit, those rationales have been oversold, creating
expectations that directors of color cannot realistically fulfill. Indeed,
those rationales suggest that directors of color will be able to single269. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 406, 408 (2001) (noting
that the case law allows directors to allocate resources to all relevant corporate
constituents).
270. See 2004 KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 16, at 11–12.
271. See Strauss, supra note 21.
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handedly solve the complex problems associated with workforce
diversity, while boosting a corporation’s ability to profit in a diverse
market and enhancing the board’s ability to make higher quality
decisions.
And, given the many boards on which people of color tend to serve,
such people apparently will be able to accomplish this feat for several
different corporations at once. Then too, they apparently will be able to
accomplish this feat while juggling the additional responsibilities imposed
upon them by Sarbanes-Oxley and other reforms, as well as the
responsibilities they must satisfy in their actual full-time jobs. Viewed in
this light, the business rationales appear unrealistic, and as such may
prove unconvincing to corporations. In this regard, adoption of these
business rationales, particularly as the sole or dominant strategy for
diversity, appears flawed at best.
Moreover, this strategy may do more harm than good for diversity
efforts. Given corporate America’s apparent unwillingness to accept
moral or social justifications for diversity, there are some practical
benefits to utilizing business rationales. However, it is important to
assess the costs of grounding diversity considerations in arguments about
economics or the market. These costs include the possibility that business
rationales may lead to the overextension, the marginalization, and even
the devaluation of people of color. Then too, challenging those unwilling
to accept the moral and social imperative of diversity may be more
important and beneficial than shifting the conversation to one that
embraces rationales that are more palatable, but less valid. Diversity is an
important goal in and of itself, and it may be costly to hide behind market
rhetoric in order to achieve it. In this regard, evaluating the merits of
business rationales includes ensuring that directors’ quest to win the “race
to the top” proves beneficial to them and the communities from which
they come. In light of the flaws within the business rationales and the
costs associated with their adoption, winning the race based on those
rationales may prove to be a hollow victory.

